The Lingering Bigotry of State Constitution Religious Tests by Vestal, Allan W
University of Maryland Law Journal of Race, Religion, Gender
and Class
Volume 15 | Issue 1 Article 3
The Lingering Bigotry of State Constitution
Religious Tests
Allan W. Vestal
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/rrgc
Part of the First Amendment Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in University of Maryland Law Journal of Race, Religion, Gender and Class by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey
Law. For more information, please contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Allan W. Vestal, The Lingering Bigotry of State Constitution Religious Tests, 15 U. Md. L.J. Race Relig. Gender & Class 55 (2015).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/rrgc/vol15/iss1/3
Vestal  
 
 
 
 
 
THE LINGERING BIGOTRY OF STATE 
CONSTITUTION RELIGIOUS TESTS 
 
Allan W. Vestal

 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In her Town of Greece dissent Justice Elena Kagan describes 
the position of a citizen who does not conform to state-sponsored 
religious practice:   
 
. . . she becomes a different kind of citizen, one who 
will not join in the religious practice that the Town 
Board has chosen as reflecting its own and the 
community’s most cherished beliefs. And she thus 
stands at a remove, based solely on religion, from her 
fellow citizens and her elected representatives.
1
 
 
In Justice Kagan’s example, a Muslim citizen wishes to appear 
before the town board.  Before she appears “a minister deputized by 
the Town asks her to pray ‘in the name of God’s only son Jesus 
Christ.’”2  Given the evident connection between Christian worship 
and the board,
3
 she faces a choice: 
 
. . . to pray alongside the majority as one of that group 
or somehow to register her deeply felt difference. She is 
a strong person, but that is no easy call—especially 
given that the room is small and her every action (or 
inaction) will be noticed. She does not wish to be rude 
to her neighbors, nor does she wish to aggravate the 
Board members whom she will soon be trying to 
persuade. And yet she does not want to acknowledge 
                                                 
© 2015 Allan W. Vestal.  

  Professor of Law, Drake University Law School.   
1
 Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1850 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
2
 Id.  
3
 Id. (“She must think—it is hardly paranoia, but only the truth—that Christian 
worship has become entwined with local governance.”). 
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Christ’s divinity, any more than many of her 
neighbors would want to deny that tenet.
4
  
 
If she chooses an option consistent with her religious beliefs – 
declining to participate in the Christian prayer or standing up and 
leaving the room – the citizen of Muslim faith is forced to stand at a 
remove from her fellow citizens.  
 
Over the course of our national history citizens have often been 
forced to stand at a remove based on religious belief.  One mechanism 
has been through our most basic laws; from the Revolution to the 
present day, citizens have been set apart based on their religious 
beliefs by virtue of provisions in our state constitutions. 
 
 One way in which state constitutions have placed Catholics, 
Jews and non-believers apart at various times in our national history 
has been through religious tests for public office.  Typically these tests 
were straightforward.  For example, the Mississippi constitution of 
1890 provided: “No person who denies the existence of a Supreme 
Being shall hold any office in this state.”5  Eight states retain these 
provisions in their current constitutions.
6
 
 
 A second way in which state constitutions have placed groups 
disfavored on grounds of religious belief at a remove has been through 
religious tests for testimonial competency.  Less common in state 
constitutions than religious tests for public office, these provisions 
were equally straightforward.  For example, the Arkansas constitution 
of 1874 provided: “No person who denies the being of a God shall . . . 
                                                 
4
 Id.  
5
 See infra app. A.5.e. In contrast, eight states had constitutional provisions barring 
all clergymen from office, none of which survived the 19
th
 Century. See DEL. 
CONST. of 1776, art. XXIX; DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. I, § 9; FLA. CONST. of 1838, 
art. VI, § 10; GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LXII; GA. CONST. of 1789, art. I, § 18; KY. 
CONST. of 1800, art. II, § 26; MD. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 11; MISS. CONST. of 
1817, art. VI, § 7; N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXIX; N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. VII, § 
4; S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 23. The clauses were removed in these eights states 
with adoptions of subsequent constitutions. See DEL. CONST. of 1831; FLA. CONST. 
of 1865; GA. CONST. of 1798; KY. CONST. of 1850; MD. CONST. of 1864; MISS. 
CONST. of 1832; N.Y. CONST. of 1846; S.C.  CONST. of 1895. 
6
 See infra apps. A.1.d, 3.c, 5.e, 7.e, 8.e, 9.a, 10.c, 11.a. 
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be competent to testify as a witness in any court.”7  Two states retain 
these provisions in their current constitutions.
8
 
 
The following discussion turns first to religious tests for public 
office,
9
 then to religious tests for testimonial competence,
10
 looking at 
both in terms of their history and contemporary status.  Following we 
discuss some public policy reasons these state constitutional religious 
tests should be of concern.
11
  The conclusion proposes a course of 
action.
12
   
 
As we shall see, the importance of these state constitutional 
provisions has always been in their symbolism, not in their day-to-day 
impact on who served in public positions or who testified in court.  
But their symbolic importance has been significant.  Through such 
provisions certain of our state constitutions affirmed that, based solely 
on religious belief, some citizens were unworthy to serve in public 
capacities and undeserving to be believed in judicial proceedings.  
These state constitutional provisions unfairly placed some of our 
fellow citizens at a substantial remove from the rest of society. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 ARK. CONST. of 1874, art. XIX, § 1. 
8
 See infra apps. C.1.c & 2.c. 
9
 See infra Part I. 
10
 See infra Part II. 
11
 See infra Part III. 
12
 See infra Part IV. 
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I. RELIGIOUS TESTS FOR PUBLIC OFFICE 
  
If you’re an atheist and don’t believe in God and still 
want to hold office, I have a problem with that.  And the 
constitution of North Carolina has a problem with that. 
      
     H.K. Edgerton
13
 
 
 
 In the fall of 2009, H.K. Edgerton had a cause.
14
  Cecil 
Bothwell was running for the Asheville, North Carolina city council.  
Edgerton opposed Bothwell, and thought him ineligible to serve.  For 
Cecil Bothwell did not “believe in supernatural beings of any stripe,”15 
and the North Carolina constitution barred from office “any person 
who shall deny the being of Almighty God.”16 
 
Bothwell won the election and was sworn in as a member of 
                                                 
13
 David Zucchino, Councilman Under Fire for Atheism, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 20, 
2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/dec/20/nation/la-na-hometown-asheville20-
2009dec20. 
14
 H.K. Edgerton does not give up on lost causes.  An African-American, he is 
known as a “Southern heritage activist.”  Stephanie McNeal, Unenforceable Ban on 
Atheists Holding Public Office Still on the Books in 8 States, FOX NEWS (July 16, 
2014), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/07/16/states-atheists-banned-public-
office/.  He describes himself as being: 
[A] black Confederate activist who works tirelessly to bring the 
real truth of our heritage to people of all races.  [He] has walked 
thousands of miles carrying his large Confederate Battle Flag 
through cities and towns and down country roads.  He speaks at 
venues all over the South exposing the many myths of Yankee 
history and setting the record straight regarding [the] black role in 
the history of the South. 
Southern Heritage 411, SOUTHERNHERITAGE411.COM, 
http://www.southernheritage411.com/index.shtml (last visited Apr. 15, 2015). 
15
 Rob Boston, North Carolina Politicians Seek to Unseat Councilman Because He’s 
an Atheist, ALTERNET (Feb. 1, 2010), 
http://www.alternet.org/story/145501/north_carolina_politicians_seek_to_unseat_co
uncilman_because_he's_an_atheist (quoting CECIL BOTHWELL, THE PRINCE OF WAR: 
BILLY GRAHAM’S CRUSADE FOR A WHOLLY CHRISTIAN EMPIRE (1st ed. 2007)).  He 
is variously described by others as an “atheist,” a “post-theist,” “Satan’s helper,” a 
“radical extremist,” and is a member of the Unitarian Universalist Church.  
Zucchino, supra note 13.   
16
 N.C. CONST. of 1971, art. VI, § 8. 
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the Asheville city council.  Edgerton threatened litigation but did not 
follow through.  What if the issue had been joined?  Would Bothwell 
have been barred from service?  The answer is found in the earlier 
experiences of Roy Torcaso, a bookkeeper from Maryland, and Herb 
Silverman, a math professor from South Carolina. 
   
 Roy Torcaso was in most respects an unexceptional man.  Born 
in 1910 into a farm family in Washington state, he served in the Army 
in both World War II and Korea.  A bookkeeper by training, he 
worked a series of mundane jobs and died in 2007.
17
  The exceptional 
chapter of Roy Torcaso’s life began in 1959.  Employed by a 
Maryland construction company, at his employer’s suggestion Roy 
applied to become a notary public.  His application was denied 
because he refused to swear to a state mandated oath that affirmed the 
existence of God.  For Roy, the son of a Catholic father and a 
Protestant mother, was an atheist and in 1959 Maryland had a 
constitutional provision that imposed a religious test for state office 
holders: “That no religious test ought ever to be required as a 
qualification for any office of profit or trust in this State, other than a 
declaration of belief in the existence of God . . .”18  
 
 Over thirty years later Herb Silverman applied to be a notary 
public in South Carolina.  His application was rejected because he 
struck through the portion of the required oath that read “So help me 
God.”19  For Herb was an atheist20 and in 1992 South Carolina had a 
constitutional provision that imposed a religious test for state office 
                                                 
17
 Adam Bernstein, Roy Torcaso, 96; Defeated Md. In 1961 Religious Freedom 
Case, WASH. POST (June 21, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/06/20/AR2007062002276.html. 
18
 See infra app. A.3.c (emphasis added).  The provision remains in the Maryland 
constitution to this day. See MD. CONST. art. XXXVII. 
19
 Silverman v. Campbell, 486 S.E.2d 1, 1 (S.C. 1997). 
20
 A self-described “mild-mannered mathematics professor and liberal, Jewish, 
Yankee atheist,” Silverman ran for Governor of South Carolina in 1990 and in his 
book, Candidate Without a Prayer, Silverman described his experiences. Herb 
Silverman The Unflappable Atheist, HERB SILVERMAN, 
http://www.herbsilverman.com/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2015). The Fourth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss Silverman’s lawsuit, 
brought on behalf of those who wish to run for state office and who deny the 
existence of a supreme being, based on ripeness.  Silverman v. Ellisor, No. 91-1022, 
1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 18506, at *1 (4th Cir. Aug. 14, 1991). 
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holders: “No person who denies the existence of a Supreme Being 
shall hold any office under this Constitution.”21 
 
 The situation in which Cecil Bothwell, Roy Torcaso and Herb 
Silverman found themselves was not unusual.  Twelve states have had 
religious tests for office in their state constitutions:  Arkansas, 
Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Jersey, North 
Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and 
Vermont.
22
   
 
 There was variation in the formulation of the state constitution 
religious tests.  The narrowest, adopted by three states, permitted only 
Protestant Christians to hold office, excluding Catholics, Jews, and 
non-believers.
23
  Thus there was a time when – based solely on their 
respective religious beliefs – no current member of the Supreme Court 
could have been an elected official in New Jersey, North Carolina, or 
Vermont.
24
   
 
 A number of broader formulations moved Catholics into 
favored status by permitting Christians to hold office.  These broader 
formulations included the four states which required an affirmation of 
the divine inspiration of the Old and New Testaments,
25
 the three 
states which required a declaration of belief in the “Christian 
religion,”26 and the state that required a profession of “faith in God the 
                                                 
21
 Actually, the provision appeared twice in the South Carolina constitution. S.C.  
CONST. of 1895, art. VI, § 2 (“No person who denies the existence of a Supreme 
Being shall hold any office under this Constitution.”); S.C.  CONST. of 1895, art. 
XVII, § 4 (“No person who denies the existence of a Supreme Being shall hold any 
office under this Constitution.”).  The provisions remain in the South Carolina 
constitution to this day. See S.C. CONST. art. VI, § 2; S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 4. 
22
 See infra app. A. 
23
 New Jersey, North Carolina, and Vermont required a declaration of faith in the 
protestant religion.  See infra apps. A.6.a, 7.a, 12.a, 12.b. 
24
 See infra apps. A.6.a, 7.a, 12.a. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kennedy, 
Scalia, Sotomayor, and Thomas are Catholic; Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan 
are Jewish. 
25
 Delaware, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Vermont required an affirmation of 
the divine inspiration of the Old and New Testaments.  See infra apps. A.2.a, 7.a, 
7.b, 7.c, 8.a, 12.a, 12.b. 
26
 Maryland, Massachusetts and Vermont required a declaration of faith in the 
Christian religion.  See infra apps. A.3.a, 3.b, 4.a, 7.b. 
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Father, and in Jesus Christ His only Son, and in the Holy Ghost, One 
God, blessed for evermore.”27   
 
 A broader formulation moved Jews into favored status:
28
 four 
states required an affirmation of belief in a “future state of rewards and 
punishments.”29  The broadest set of formulations, which excluded 
only non-believers,
30
 was adopted by ten states.
31
  These included a 
requirement that the office holder declare a belief in God
32
 or a 
supreme being,
33
 or in the alternative an exclusion of those who denied 
the existence of God
34
 or a supreme being.
35
   
 
 Although not uncommon, state constitution religious tests for 
office have not dominated the national landscape.  Thirty-two states 
have had prohibitions on religious tests in their state constitutions.
36
  
                                                 
27
 Delaware had this formulation.  See infra app. A.2.a. 
28
 The Maryland Constitution of 1851 having first required “a declaration of belief in 
the Christian religion,” it subsequently provided that “if the party shall profess to be 
a Jew, the declaration shall be of his belief in a future state of rewards and 
punishments.” See infra app. A.3.a. 
29
 Maryland, Mississippi, Pennsylvania and Tennessee required an affirmation of 
belief in a future state of rewards and punishments.  See infra apps. A.3.b, 5.a, 5.b, 
5.d, 5.e, 8.b, 8.c, 8.d, 8.e, 10.a, 10.c. 
30
 This discussion uses the term non-believer, not atheist or agnostic, because the 
typical religious tests are cast in terms of belief in a God or a Supreme Being.  Such 
a formulation includes atheists and agnostics, but it also includes believers in faith 
traditions that do not have a God or Supreme Being.  Schowgurow v. State, 213 
A.2d 475, 478 (Md. 1965) (“[T]he Buddhist religion . . . does not teach a belief in 
the existence of God or a Supreme Being.”); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 
n.11 (1961) (“Among religions in this country which do not teach what would 
generally be considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, 
Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others.”).  
31
 Ten states – Arkansas, Delaware, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont – adopted one or more of 
these formulations. See infra notes 32–35. 
32
 See infra apps. A.2.a, 3.b, 8.a, 8.b, 8.c, 8.d, 8.e, 12.a, 12.b. 
33
 See infra app. A.11.a. 
34
 See infra apps. A.1.a, 1.b, 1.d, 5.a, 5.b, 7.a, 7.b, 7.c, 7.d, 7.e, 10.a, and 10.c. In 
addition, North Carolina excluded from office individuals “who shall hold religious 
principles incompatible with the freedom and safety of the State . . . .”  See infra 
apps. A.7.a, 7.b, 7.c. 
35
 See infra apps. A.5.d, 5.e, 9.a. 
36
They are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, 
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, 
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There is a clear historical trend away from state constitutional 
religious tests for office.  While a handful of states had religious tests 
for office in their state constitutions from the revolution, the first state 
constitution prohibition of such tests did not appear until 1792.
37
  The 
number of states with such tests exceeded the number with 
prohibitions until 1820, when the count stood at six with tests and six 
with prohibitions.  But the next year, 1821, the number of state 
constitution prohibitions exceeded the number of state constitution 
tests, and that relationship has grown substantially over the following 
one-hundred and ninety-three years.
38
  Indeed, while sixteen states 
adopted constitutional prohibitions on religious tests prior to 1850, 
only two states adopted constitutional religious tests in the 20
th
 
Century.
39
 
 
 Today, eight states retain religious tests for public office in 
their constitutions: Arkansas, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas.
40
  In form, these 
contemporary state constitution religious tests for office are 
                                                                                                                   
Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See infra app. B. 
37
 Delaware wins the prize for being the first adopter both of a religious test, in 1776, 
and a prohibition on religious tests, in 1792.  See infra apps. A.2.a & B.5.a  
38
 The delta between the number of states with constitutional prohibitions and the 
number with religious tests for office has grown steadily, especially if one corrects 
for the 1860s oddities in state constitutions of states engaged in the rebellion.  Even 
without correcting for the rebellion, grouping the years into decades produces the 
following average deltas:  
 
1820s  1.8 1860s  14.0 1900s  13.0 1940s  14.0 1980s  16.4 
1830s  4.1 1870s  11.9 1910s  17.7 1950s  14.0 1990s  17.0 
1840s  7.4 1880s  10.4 1920s  14.0 1960s  14.0 2000s  17.0 
1850s  9.7 1890s  13.4 1930s  14.0 1970s  15.6 2010s  17.0 
 
39
 The sixteen states which adopted constitutional prohibitions on religious tests prior 
to 1850 were Delaware (1792), Ohio (1802), Indiana (1816), Illinois (1818), 
Alabama (1819), Maine (1820), Missouri (1820), New York (1821), Virginia (1830), 
Michigan (1835), Tennessee (1835), New Jersey (1844), Texas (1845), Iowa (1846), 
Wisconsin (1848), and California (1849).  See infra apps. B.1.a, 4.a, 5.a, 7.a, 8.a, 9.a, 
12.a, 13.a, 15.a, 18.a, 19.a, 21.a, 25.a, 26.a, 28.a, 31.a. The two states which adopted 
constitutional religious tests in the 20
th
 Century were Pennsylvania (1968) and North 
Carolina (1971).  See infra apps. A. 7.e & 8.e. 
40
 See infra apps. A.1.d, 3.c, 5.e, 7.e, 8.e, 9.a, 10.c, 11.a.  
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straightforward.  Arkansas, Maryland, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, 
and Tennessee require a belief in God;
41
 Mississippi, South Carolina, 
and Texas require a belief in a Supreme Being.
42
  Pennsylvania and 
Tennessee add language relating to belief in a future state of rewards 
and punishments.
43
  On the other side, twenty-six states retain 
prohibitions on religious tests in their current constitutions.
44
 
 
 Both Roy Torcaso and Herb Silverman litigated the state 
constitution religious tests that kept them from becoming notary 
publics.  Torcaso challenged the Maryland provision before the 
Maryland Court of Appeals on First Amendment grounds.
45
  The 
Maryland Court of Appeals rejected Torcaso’s challenge, predicting 
that the United States Supreme Court would not invalidate the 
religious test for office: 
 
In the absence of any direct authority on the point, we 
find it difficult to believe that the Supreme Court will 
hold that a declaration of belief in the existence of God, 
required by Article 37 of our Declaration of Rights as a 
qualification for State office, is discriminatory and 
invalid. As Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for a 
majority of the Court in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 
                                                 
41
 See infra apps. A.1.d, 3.c, 7.e, 8.e, 10.c.  
42
 See infra apps. A.5.e, 9.a, 11.a. 
43
 See infra apps. A.8.e & 10.c. 
44
 They are Alabama, Arizona, California, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, 
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See infra apps. B.1.e, 2.a, 
4.b, 5.c, 6.g, 8.b, 9.b, 10.a, 12.a, 13.d, 14.a, 15.d, 16.a, 17.a, 18.b, 20.a, 21.b, 22.a, 
23.a, 24.a, 27.a, 28.b, 29.a, 30.c, 31.a, 32.a. 
45
 Torcaso v. Watkins, 162 A.2d 438, 442 (Md. 1960) (“The appellant contends, in 
effect, that the State Constitutional qualification deprives him of his ‘liberty’ to 
disbelieve in God, and discriminates against him as a nonbeliever.”). Torcaso did not 
seek to invalidate the Maryland provision on the basis of the direct application of the 
Federal Constitution’s Article VI prohibition on religious tests for office. See id. 
(“The appellant does not contend that clause three of Art. VI of the Federal 
Constitution is applicable to the states. That clause, providing that ‘no religious Test 
shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the 
United States,’ is plainly inapplicable.”).  Nor did he claim the Article VI prohibition 
was applicable through the Fourteenth Amendment.  See id. (“Nor is it contended 
that this clause could be imported into the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
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306, 313, said: “We are a religious people whose 
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.”46  
 
The Maryland court based its prediction, in part, on the 
existence of a related type of discrimination against non-believers: the 
exclusion of their testimony as incompetent. 
  
The problem here is more basic than in any of the cases 
cited. An oath, predicated upon a belief in God, is a 
regular incident of judicial proceedings. There can be 
no doubt that at common law an atheist was 
incompetent as a witness. There has been 
no constitutional or statutory abrogation of the common 
law rule in this State.
47
 
 
The Maryland court ultimately found itself essentially arguing 
that the bigotry written into its constitution was justified: 
 
To the members of the Convention, as to the voters 
who adopted our Constitution, belief in God was 
equated with a belief in moral accountability and the 
sanctity of an oath. We may assume that there may be 
permissible differences in the individual's conception of 
God. But it seems clear that under our Constitution 
disbelief in a Supreme Being, and the denial of any 
moral accountability for conduct, not only renders a 
person incompetent to hold public office, but to give 
testimony, or serve as a juror.
48
  
 
Of course, equating disbelief in a supreme being with the 
denial of any moral accountability is a stunningly ignorant position.  
The court was reduced to arguing that “we cannot say that the 
distinction between believers and non-believers is so patently 
inappropriate as a security for good conduct, as to make it invidious 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.”49 
                                                 
46
 Id. at 443. 
47
 Id. (citations omitted). 
48
 Id. 
49
 Id. at 444.  
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 The Maryland Court of Appeals could not have been more 
wrong in its prediction of how the Unites States Supreme Court would 
rule.  Writing for the Court, Justice Black found that the Maryland 
constitutional provision “sets up a religious test which was designed to 
and, if valid, does bar every person who refuses to declare a belief in 
God from holding a public ‘office of profit or trust’ in Maryland.”50  
Justice Black noted “that there is much historical precedent for such 
laws.”51 
 
Indeed, it was largely to escape religious test oaths and 
declarations that a great many of the early colonists left 
Europe and came here hoping to worship in their own 
way.  It soon developed, however, that many of those 
who had fled to escape religious test oaths turned out to 
be perfectly willing, when they had the power to do so, 
to force dissenters from their faith to take test oaths in 
conformity with that faith.  This brought on a host of 
laws in the new Colonies imposing burdens and 
disabilities of various kinds upon varied beliefs 
depending largely upon what group happened to be 
politically strong enough to legislate in favor of its own 
beliefs.  The effect of all this was the formal or 
practical “establishment” of particular religious faiths 
in most of the Colonies, with consequent burdens 
imposed on the free exercise of the faiths of nonfavored 
believers.
52
 
 
Having noted an earlier pronouncement by the Court that “the 
test oath is abhorrent to our tradition,”53 Justice Black quoted at length 
from Everson v. Board of Education: 
 
The “establishment of religion” clause of the First 
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the 
Federal Government can set up a church.  Neither can 
                                                 
50
 Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 489–90. 
51
 Id. at 490. 
52
 Id. 
53
 Id. at 491 (citing Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946)). 
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pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or 
prefer one religion over another.  Neither can force nor 
influence a person to go to or to remain away from 
church against his will or force him to profess a belief 
or disbelief in any religion.  No person can be punished 
for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or 
disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. . . . 
In the words of Jefferson, the clause against 
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 
“a wall of separation between church and State.”54 
 
Finally, Justice Black rejected the argument that the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Zorach required a different result: “Nothing 
decided or written in Zorach lends support to the idea that the Court 
there intended to open up the way for government, state or federal, to 
restore the historically and constitutionally discredited policy of 
probing religious beliefs by test oaths or limiting public offices to 
persons who have, or perhaps more properly profess to have, a belief 
in some particular kind of religious concept.”55 
 
 The Torcaso Court’s conclusion was clear: 
 
We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor 
the Federal Government can constitutionally force a 
person “to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.”  
Neither can constitutionally pass laws or impose 
requirements which aid all religions as against non-
believers, and neither can aid those religions based on a 
belief in the existence of God as against those religions 
                                                 
54
 Id. at 492–93 (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–6 (1947)).  Justice 
Black also quotes Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. 
Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 213 (1948) joined in by the other dissenters in Everson: 
“We are all agreed that the First and Fourteenth Amendments have a secular reach 
far more penetrating in the conduct of Government than merely to forbid an 
‘established church’ . . . . We renew our conviction that ‘we have staked the very 
existence of our country on the faith that complete separation between the state and 
religion is best for the state and best for religion.’” Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 493–94.  
55
 Id. at 494. 
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founded on different beliefs.
56
 
 
 Thirty years after Torcaso, Herb Silverman challenged the 
state constitution religious test that kept him from becoming a notary 
public.
57
  The trial court found two provisions of the South Carolina 
constitution to violate both the First Amendment and the Religious 
Test Clause of the Federal Constitution.
58
  The South Carolina 
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court holding.
59
 
 
 Other state constitutional religious tests for office have been 
challenged.  The Texas constitutional provision was challenged in 
Federal court in the early 1980s.
60
  The Fifth Circuit allowed some of 
the claims to go forward and, although it did not decide on the merits, 
indicated that “it is difficult to distinguish this case from Torcaso v. 
Watkins . . .” and quoted from the Torcaso opinion: 
 
We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor 
the Federal Government can constitutionally force a 
person “to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.”  
Neither can constitutionally pass laws or impose 
requirements which aid all religions as against non-
believers, and neither can aid those religions based on a 
                                                 
56
 Id. at 495.  Torcaso was decided on the basis of the First Amendment; the Court 
did not reach the claim that the Maryland oath violated the ban on religious tests 
under Article VI. Id. at 489 n.1. (“Appellant also claimed that the State’s test oath 
requirement violates the provision of Art. VI of the Federal Constitution that ‘no 
religious test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust 
under the United States.’  Because we are reversing the judgment on other grounds, 
we find it unnecessary to consider appellant’s contention that this provision applies 
to state as well as federal offices.”). 
57
 Silverman v. Campbell, 486 S.E.2d 1, 2 (S.C. 1997). 
58
 Id. 
59
 Id. The Silverman court cites Torcaso for the proposition that the “Maryland 
Constitution’s Supreme Being Clause violates First Amendment and Religious Test 
Clause.” Id. (citing Torcaso, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). This is in error, as the Torcaso 
opinion did not reach the question of whether the Maryland provision violated the 
Article VI religious test provision. Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 489 n.1. 
60
 O’Hair v. Hill, 641 F.2d 307, 309–313 (5th Cir. 1981), reh’g granted O’Hair v. 
White, 675 F.2d 680 (5th Cir., 1982) (dismissing the case without expressing an 
opinion as to the constitutionality of the Texas religious test provision), 
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belief in the existence of God as against those religions 
rounded on different beliefs.
61
 
 
 The Mississippi constitutional provision
62
 was challenged in 
Federal court in the mid-1980s.
63
  As to standing and the substantive 
analysis, the Mississippi district court noted the Fifth Circuit analysis 
in O’Hare v. White.  The district court also noted the Torcaso v. 
Watkins decision: “it is clear that under the analysis of the Supreme 
Court in Torcaso v. Watkins . . . that this provision of the Mississippi 
State Constitution is constitutionally infirm.”64   
 
 The Arkansas constitutional provision
65
 was challenged in 
Federal court in the early 1980s upon the theory that the provision was 
a bill of attainder and violated the establishment clause of the First 
Amendment.
66
  The district court dismissed the claim on standing 
based on the lack of an actual or threatened injury.  The Eighth Circuit 
affirmed, but stated in a footnote: “Although we do not reach the 
merits of appellants’ constitutional claim given the procedural posture 
of this case, we note that the challenged section would appear to be 
inconsistent with Torcaso v. Watkins . . . .”67  Ten years later the 
Attorney General of Arkansas, relying on the Eighth Circuit’s footnote 
in Flora v. White and the Supreme Court holding in Torcaso, issued an 
opinion “that if a plaintiff with proper standing brings a claim that is 
ripe for adjudication, art. 19, §1 will most likely be declared 
unconstitutional.”68  The Arkansas constitutional provision has also 
been the subject of commentary in the Arkansas Law Review.
69
  
                                                 
61
 White, 675 F.2d at 696 n.34 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495). 
62
 MISS. CONST. of 1890, art. XIV, § 265 (“No person who denies the existence of a 
Supreme Being shall hold any office in this state.”). 
63
 See Tirmenstein v. Allain, 607 F.Supp. 1145 (S.D. Miss. 1985). 
64
 Id. at 1146 (citations omitted). 
65
 See infra app. A.1.d (“No person who denies the being of a God shall hold any 
office in the civil departments of this State, nor be competent to testify as a witness 
in any court.”). 
66
 Flora v. White, 692 F.2d 53, 54 (8th Cir. 1982). 
67
 Id. at 54 n.2. 
68
 Letter from Winston Bryant, Attorney Gen., Opinion No. 92-164 (June 30, 1992). 
Attorney General Bryant referred in his opinion letter to both the religious test 
language of Article 6 and the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution. See id. 
69
 Seth R. Jewell, Disqualification of Atheists: Punishment for Nonbelievers in 
Arkansas, 64 ARK. L. REV. 409, 409 (2011). 
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Noting potential Constitutional challenges based on the First 
Amendment,
70
 the religious test clause of Article 6,
71
 the due process 
clause,
72
 the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
73
 
and the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment,
74
 the author 
concluded that “[i]f article XIX, section 1 was subject to a valid 
constitutional challenge, the provision would undoubtedly be held 
unconstitutional, and Arkansas would face severe embarrassment and 
damaging ridicule.”75 
 
 And what of the North Carolina constitutional religious test for 
office, under which H.K. Edgerton sought to prevent Cecil Bothwell 
from serving on the Asheville city council?  Although apparently 
neither Edgerton nor Bothwell knew it, almost forty years before 
Bothwell’s election the office of the North Carolina Attorney General 
had opined that the religious test for public office in the North 
Carolina constitution is unenforceable.
76
  Citing and quoting from 
Torcaso, the opinion concluded: 
 
In the light of the decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court, the portion of Article VI, Section 8, of 
the North Carolina Constitution, which disqualifies for 
office any person who shall deny the being of Almighty 
                                                 
70
 Id. at 418–422. 
71
 Id. at 422–24.  While the author acknowledges that the Torcaso court “did not 
explicitly address Article VI, Section 3” he asserts that “it effectively upheld its 
purpose” and suggests that as Article XIX, §1 of the Arkansas constitution “violates 
these specific purposes” it is unconstitutional. Id. at 423. The author does not address 
the language of the religious test clause of Article VI being limited to “any Office or 
public Trust under the United States.” See id. 
72
 Id. at 424–25. 
73
 Id. at 426. 
74
 Id. at 427.  The Confrontation Clause argument is perhaps not the strongest.  If the 
excluded non-believer is an adverse witness it is true the defendant will be denied 
the right to confront.  But the exclusion of the atheist witness means her adverse 
testimony will be excluded.  The defendant is thus advantaged by the 
unconstitutional exclusion.  If the excluded non-believer is favorable, the defendant 
is indeed disadvantaged.  But the disadvantage is less appropriately cast as a 
confrontation problem – one doesn’t confront favorable witnesses – than as a due 
process problem. 
75
 Id. at 416. 
76
 Robert Morgan & James F. Bullock, North Carolina Attorney General Reports, 41 
N.C.A.G. 708, 730 (1972). 
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God, violates the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and cannot be used to disqualify a person 
from office who is otherwise qualified.
77
 
 
The opinion of the North Carolina attorney general was 
confirmed seven years later, thirty years before Edgerton sought 
recourse to the North Carolina provision, in Federal court.  The 
outcome was not surprising; in 1979 a declaratory judgment was 
entered pursuant to a consent decree.  North Carolina agreed to not 
enforce its religious test.
78
  As it turns out, H.K. Edgerton had backed 
another lost cause.  Cecil Bothwell still sits on the Asheville city 
council.
79
 
 
II. RELIGIOUS TESTS FOR TESTIMONIAL COMPETENCY 
  
 I am certain that there is an obligation on my 
part to tell the truth when sworn; I am not certain that 
there is a Supreme Being who rewards and punishes 
men; I am not satisfied that it is so, and I am not 
certain that it is not so; I have no belief one way or the 
other. 
     Ira Aldrich
80
 
 
 In April of 1855, Ira Aldrich witnessed a train strike and 
grievously injure an ox owned by one Rockafellow.
81
  The ox died and 
Rockafellow sued the railroad.  The railroad called Aldrich but the 
                                                 
77
 Morgan & Bullock, supra note 76, at 730. 
78
 O’Hair v. White, 675 F.2d 680, 683 n.1 (5th Cir. 1982) (“The Society [of 
Separationists, Inc.] filed a similar suit in the United States District Court for the 
Western District of North Carolina in 1979.  In that case a declaratory judgment was 
entered on the basis of a consent decree in which the state agreed not to enforce a 
similar constitutional provision.”  (citing Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Hunt, No. 
CC 78-0351 (W.D.N.C. April 4, 1979))). 
79
 Meet City Council, ASHEVILLE, N.C., 
http://www.ashevillenc.gov/CityCouncil/MeetCityCouncil.aspx (last visited Mar. 3, 
2015). 
80
 Cent. Military Tract R.R. Co. v. Rockafellow, 17 Ill. 541, 544 (1856). 
81
 The basis for the Rockafellow holding is the common law, Illinois having neither a 
constitutional nor a statutory provision on point. The case serves to illustrate the 
theory common to the various states, whether they followed the common law or had 
a constitutional or statutory provision. Id. at 552. 
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“plaintiff objected to his being sworn on account of his want of 
religious belief . . . .”82  The trial court allowed an examination of 
Aldrich as to his religious beliefs.   
 
I don’t believe in the existence of a God, particularly; 
can’t say whether I believe it or not . . . I don’t believe 
there is a God who punishes for perjury, either in this 
world or any other; I don’t believe anything about it; it 
may be and it may not; I have no opinion about it. . . . I 
believe I should be responsible to the civil law if I 
should testify falsely; and, further, that I should be 
punished by losing the esteem of my fellow men . . . .
83
 
 
On the basis of Aldrich’s testimony, the trial court refused to 
permit him to be sworn or to testify.  Without the benefit of Aldrich’s 
testimony the railroad was assessed $50 for Rockafellow’s ox.84 
 
 Two contemporary state constitutions include religious tests 
for testimonial competency.
85
  Is it possible that, today, a witness like 
Ira Aldrich would be excluded from testifying based solely on 
religious belief? 
 
 The exclusion of some witnesses as incompetent based on their 
religious beliefs was the common law rule.  In 1215, Pope Innocent III 
and the Fourth Lateran Council issued a reform decree withdrawing 
the Church’s support for trial by ordeal.86  Seeking a replacement 
system that would continue the fundamental characteristic of being 
able to “wrap the system’s judgments in the word of God” seeing “a 
substitute that would reassure the public of God’s continuing role in 
meting out human justice,” led, it is asserted by Professor George 
Fisher in his innovative study, to a justice system that “by staking its 
                                                 
82
 Id. at 544. 
83
 Id. 
84
 Id. at 542. 
85
 See infra apps. C.1.c & C.2.c. 
86
 LATERAN IV c.18 (“Neither shall anyone in judicial tests or ordeals by hot or cold 
water or hot iron bestow any blessing . . .”); Roger D. Groot, The Early-Thirteenth-
Century Criminal Jury, in TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRUE: THE CRIMINAL TRIAL 
JURY IN ENGLAND, 1200–1800 3, 3 (J.S. Cockburn & Thomas A. Green eds., 1988); 
George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 585, 586 (1997). 
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verdicts on the oaths of witnesses . . . could claim that the threat of 
divine vengeance assured truthful outcomes.”87  
 
 But a system that depended for “divine sanction for the 
verdicts of its very human juries” on “the witness’s oath, enforced (as 
it was thought to be) by the threat of divine vengeance” was 
substantially challenged by testimony under oath that conflicted.
88
  
Thus, “a broad series of witness competency rules that barred whole 
categories of witnesses – those thought most likely to lie – from 
testifying,” Professor Fisher argues, can be seen as “guarding against 
the embarrassment of conflicting oaths” and protecting “the old 
presumption that all sworn evidence was true.”89  The groups thought 
“unlikely to tell the truth” included “slaves, women (in certain 
circumstances), those below the age of fourteen, the insane, the 
infamous, paupers, infidels, criminals, parties to the cause, children of 
parties, parents of parties, servants of parties, and enemies of 
parties.”90  The Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 issued a reformatory 
decree prohibiting “heretics” from giving testimony in court.91   
                                                 
87
 Fisher, supra note 86, at 587, 583; Paul W. Kaufman, Disbelieving Nonbelievers: 
Atheism, Competence, and Credibility in the Turn of the Century American 
Courtroom, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 395, 402 (2003) (“[T]he oath’s ‘solemn 
invocation of the vengeance of the Deity upon the witness, if he do not declare the 
whole truth’ served to dissuade potential perjurers with the threat of eternal 
damnation.” (quoting THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE OF THE LAW OF 
EVIDENCE, AND DIGEST OF PROOFS, IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 22 (2nd 
ed. 1833))). 
88
 Fisher, supra note 86, at 589. 
89
 Id. at 583–84. 
90
 Id. at 590 (quoting Charles Donahue, Jr., Proof by Witnesses in the Church Courts 
of Medieval England: An Imperfect Reception of the Learned Law, in ON THE LAWS 
AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND: ESSAYS IN THE HONOR OF SAMUEL E. THORNE 127, 
130–131 (Morris S. Arnold et al. eds., 1981)). 
91
 LATERAN IV c.3: 
We decree that those who give credence to the teachings of the 
heretics, as well as those who receive, defend, and patronize them, 
are excommunicated; and we firmly declare that after any one of 
them has been branded with excommunication, if he has 
deliberately failed to make satisfaction within a year, let him 
incur ipso jure the stigma of infamy and let him not be admitted to 
public offices or deliberations, and let him not take part in the 
election of others to such offices or use his right to give testimony 
in a court of law. . . .  
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 The reliance of the judicial system on the oaths of witnesses 
disadvantaged religious minorities and atheists.
92
  “During medieval 
times and the early Enlightenment, it was thought that only those who 
believed in a future state of rewards and punishments, governed by the 
Christian deity, could be trusted.”93 
 
 Over time there was an evolution on the exclusion of witnesses 
on grounds of religious belief.  While Lord Coke had asserted that 
only Christians could testify upon oath, by the turn of the 19
th
 Century 
testimony upon oath was allowed non-Christians who nevertheless 
believed in some type of “divine retribution for falsehoods told under 
oath.”94  Thus there developed procedures by which non-Christians 
could be sworn, including Jews (“on the Pentateuch with covered 
heads”), “Mahometans” (upon the Koran), “Gentoos” (“touching the 
foot of a Brahmin (or priest)”), Chinese (“by the ceremony of killing a 
cock, or breaking a saucer, the witness declaring that, if he speaks 
falsely, his soul will be similarly dealt with”), “a Scotch covenanter 
and a member of the Scottish Kirk” (“by holding up the hand, without 
kissing the book”), and a “Hindoo” (“by the uplifting of the hand”).95  
“Quakers and others, who profess to entertain conscientious scruples 
against taking an oath in the usual form, are allowed an affirmation, 
i.e., a solemn religious asseveration that their testimony shall be 
true.”96 
 
 But not non-believers, who remained excluded because of the 
oath:
97
 
                                                 
92
 Kaufman, supra note 87, at 403 (“Reliance on the oath . . . significantly affected 
religious minorities and atheists.”). 
93
 Id. 
94
 Fisher, supra note 86, at 657 & n.379 (“[N]othing but the belief of a God and that 
he will reward and punish us according to our deserts is necessary to qualify a man 
to take the oath.” (quoting Omichund v. Barker, Y.B. 18 Geo. 2, Hil. 1, at 545 (Ch. 
1744))); Kaufman, supra note 87, at 403.   
95
 5 JAMES M. HENDERSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL 
CASES § 2090, at 3914–15, 3914 n.19 (2nd ed. 1926) (referring to “Hindoo”). 
96
 Id. at 3915. 
97
 Kaufman, supra note 87, at 403 (“After Omychund, the common view was that 
‘not only Jews, but infidels of any country, believing in a God who enjoins truth and 
punishes falsehood, ought to be received as witnesses.’ . . . While this treatment of 
religious persons was surprisingly progressive, it did little for atheists.”). 
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The law is wise in requiring the highest attainable 
sanction for the truth of testimony given; and is 
consistent in rejecting all witnesses incapable of feeling 
this sanction, or of receiving this test; whether this 
incapacity arises from the imbecility of their 
understanding, or from its perversity.  It does not 
impute guilt or blame to either. . . . The atheist is also 
rejected because he, too, is incapable of realizing the 
obligation of an oath, in consequence of his unbelief.  
The law looks only to the fact of incapacity, not to the 
cause, or the manner of avowal.  Whether it be calmly 
insinuated, with the elegance of Gibbon, or roared forth 
in the disgusting blasphemies of Paine, still it is 
atheism; and to require the mere formality of an oath, 
from one, who avowedly despises, or is incapable of 
feeling its peculiar sanction, would be but a mockery of 
justice.
98
 
 
Even if at least one English judge was not quite sure that they 
existed: 
 
. . . I am clearly of [the] opinion that such infidels (if 
any such there be) who [either] do not believe a God, 
or, if they do, do not think that He will either reward or 
punish them in this world or in the next, cannot be 
witnesses in any case or under any circumstances, for 
this plain reason, because an oath cannot possibly be 
any tie or obligation upon them.
99
 
 
It has been suggested that the inclusion of members of non-
Christian religions – but not non-believers – “may have been a 
symptom more of religious tolerance than of any diminished regard for 
the value of the oath.”100  But nevertheless, in “progress toward 
modernity,” as one commentator observed, “this cardhouse of 
                                                 
98
 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 368, at 412 n.2 
(1842) (quoting 1 Law Reporter 346, 347). 
99
 5 HENDERSON, supra note 95, § 2090, at 3914 (quoting Lord Hale, 2d vol. 279). 
100
 Fisher, supra note 86, at 657. 
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competency rules collapsed” in the middle of the 19th Century in both 
England and the United States.  The theoretical underpinnings of the 
general collapse of competency rules included the arguments of 
Jeremy Bentham that temporal penalties for perjury were sufficient to 
guarantee truthfulness, making divine retribution on the basis of an 
oath unnecessary.
101
 
 
 While the card house of competency rules collapsed, the 
exclusion of atheists lasted longer than the other exclusions.  In 
England, Quakers and Moravians got relief from Parliament in 1828, 
conscientious objectors got some relief in 1838, and religious 
objectors got further relief in 1854.
102
  Having failed in 1861 and 
1863, proponents secured an end to the exclusion of atheist testimony 
in England only in 1869.
103
   
 
 In the United States ending the exclusion of atheist testimony 
was a matter of state decision and the states moved quite unevenly.  
With adoption of its constitution of 1846, Iowa became the first state 
to ban religious tests for witness competency as a matter of 
constitutional law.
104
  New York quickly followed.
105
 
 
Iowa and New York provided a model for other states to allow 
testimony without regard to religious belief as a matter of 
constitutional law.  In all, twenty-two states have had constitutional 
                                                 
101
 Kaufman, supra note 87, at 403–04. 
102
 Id. at 404–05. 
103
Fisher, supra note 86, at 659 (citing An Act for the Further Amendment of the 
Law of Evidence, 32 & 33 Vict., ch. 68 § 4 (1869)); Kaufman, supra note 87, at 405. 
104
 IOWA CONST. art. I, § 4  (stating that “no person shall be . . . rendered 
incompetent to give evidence in any court of law or equity, in consequence of his 
opinions on the subject of religion”). An identical provision had been included in 
Iowa’s 1844 constitution, which was not adopted because of a dispute with Congress 
over the boundaries of the new state. See IOWA CONST. art. I, §4 (1844). 
105
 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 3.  The Iowa and New York efforts were essentially 
contemporaneous. The Iowa convention met for fifteen days in May of 1846; the 
Iowa Constitution of 1846 was adopted by popular vote on August 3, 1846.  The 
New York convention met from June 1 to October 9, 1846; the New York 
Constitution of 1846 was adopted by popular vote in November.  The New York 
Constitution of 1846 provides “. . . no person shall be rendered incompetent to be a 
witness on account of his opinion on matters of religious belief . . . .” Id. 
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prohibitions on religious tests for testimonial competency.
106
  They 
are, in chronological order: Iowa (1846), New York (1846), Wisconsin 
(1848), California (1849), Indiana (1851), Ohio (1851), Minnesota 
(1857), Kansas (1859), Oregon (1859), Nevada (1864), Missouri 
(1865), Florida (1868), Illinois (1870), Nebraska (1875), Texas 
(1876), North Dakota (1889), Washington (1889), Wyoming (1889), 
Utah (1895), Michigan (1908), Arizona (1912), and Alabama 
(1931).
107
  All but Florida retain their constitutional provisions today.  
Eleven states have had statutory provisions that rejected religious tests 
for testimonial competency.
108
  An additional eight states rejected 
religious tests for testimonial competency as a matter of common 
law.
109
  
                                                 
106
 Two additional states, Virginia and West Virginia, have constitutional provisions 
that are somewhat ambiguous. VA CONST. art. I, § 16 (stating that “the General 
Assembly shall not prescribe any religious test whatever . . . ”); W. VA. CONST. art. 
III, §11 (stating that “[n]o religious or political test oath shall be required as a pre-
requisite or qualification to vote, serve as a juror, sue, plead, appeal, or pursue any 
profession or employment”). 
107
 See infra apps. D.1.a, 2.a, 3.a, 4.a, 5.a, 6.a, 7.a, 8.a, 9.a, 10.a, 11.a, 12.a, 13.a, 
14.a, 15.a, 16.a, 17.a, 18.a, 19.a, 20.a  [AL & IA missing from abstract]. 
108
 Kaufman, supra note 87, at 410 n.88 (Colorado); Id. at 419 & n.154 (1886 Conn. 
Pub. Acts 588) (Connecticut). Kaufman dates the Connecticut change to 1875, 
apparently in error since he cites CONN. GEN. STAT. tit. 19, ch. 11, § 35 (1875) as 
having “carried forward [an Omychund rule that a belief in a future state of rewards 
and punishments was necessary to qualify a witness] . . . .”  Id.; Id. at 417 n.138 
(Delaware); Id. at 413–14 (IDAHO TERRITORY COMP. & REV. LAWS § 617 (1875)) 
(Idaho); Id. at 414 & n.117 (MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 131, § 12 (1830), confirmed in 
Allan v. Guarante, 148 N.E. 461 (Mass., 1925)) (Massachusetts); Id. at 412–13 &  
n.106 (MISS. REV. CODE ch. 58, 1604 (1880) (“No person shall be incompetent as a 
witness because of defect of religious belief.”)) (Mississippi); Id. at 419 n.155 
(LAWS OF MONT. TERRITORY, Civ. P. Act, § 444 (1872)) (Montana); Id. at 409–10 
(Penn. P.L. 140 (1909)) (Pennsylvania); Id. at 420 (State v. Riddel, 96 A. 531 (R.I., 
1916) cites R.I. GEN. LAWS ch. 32, § 10 (1909) for the word “oath” to include 
“affirmation,” and thus the competency of atheist testimony. As the rule traces back 
to at least 1822, this is taken to suggest that atheists could have testified in Rhode 
Island as of that date.  Id. at 420 n.161) (Rhode Island); Id. at 414 (TENN. ACTS ch. 
10, § 1 (1895)) (Tennessee); and Id. at 410 n.87 (VT. GEN. ASSEMBLY, Res. No. 12 
(1851) (“No person shall be deemed to be incompetent as a witness in any court, 
matter, or proceeding, on account of his opinions on matters of religious belief . . .”)) 
(Vermont). 
109
 Kaufman, supra note 87, at 414–15 (Georgia); Id. at 410–11 (Kentucky); Id. at 
411 (Maine); Id. at 417 n.139 (New Hampshire); Id. at 417 n.140 (New Jersey); Id. 
at 415 n.123 (Oklahoma); Id. at 412 (Virginia);,Id. at 412 (West Virginia). 
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 By 1864, reference could be made to the almost universal 
rejection among the states of witness competence bars based on 
religion, this in the context of legislation which would have 
guaranteed the right of blacks to testify in Federal courts: 
 
The general practice and the tendency of opinion now 
is to take away all disqualification of witnesses upon 
any ground, and to leave their testimony to go to the 
jury and the court for them to weigh it and do justice.  
In many of our States now, even the parties to an action 
are competent witnesses; and no objection in point of 
law exists in nearly all the States on account of a man’s 
religious sentiments.  All those disqualifications have 
been swept away, and we think it time to do it here in 
relation to colored people, and to make them competent 
witnesses in the United States courts.  The courts and 
the juries of course will judge of their credibility.
110
 
 
 In contrast, only two states, Arkansas
111
 and Maryland,
112
 have 
had constitutional prohibitions on atheist testimony.  Both states retain 
their discriminatory provisions today.
113
 
 
Arkansas has been governed by four constitutions – 1836, 
1864, 1868, and 1874.
114
  The constitutions of 1836,
115
 1864,
116
 and 
1874
117
 contained religious tests for testimonial competency.  The 
constitution of 1868, which was adopted as part of the effort to get 
Arkansas readmitted to the Union after its participation in the 
rebellion, did not contain a religious test for testimonial competency.  
                                                 
110
 Fisher, supra note 86, at 680. 
111
 See infra apps. C.1.a, C.1.b, C.1.c. 
112
 See infra apps. C.2.a, C.2.b, C.2.c. 
113
 See infra apps. C.2.a, C.2.b, C.2.c. 
114
 Some historians speak of an Arkansas constitution of 1861.  This document, 
which in the main followed the 1836 constitution but changed references to “the 
United States of America” to “the Confederate States of America.”  This 
“constitution” was not submitted to the people of Arkansas for ratification. 
115
 See infra app. C.1.a. 
116
 See infra app. C.1.b. 
117
 See infra app. C.1.c. 
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But the effect of the religious tests for testimonial competency in the 
Arkansas constitutions was not clear because each of the four 
Arkansas constitutions also contained provisions guaranteeing that the 
rights and capacities of citizens would not be diminished on account of 
religious belief.
118
   
 
 One Arkansas academic addressed the interplay between the 
religious test for testimonial competency in Article XIX, §1 and the 
bar on religious tests for competency in Article II, §26.
119
  Dean Ralph 
Barnhart noted the wide range of reasons a witness might have been 
deemed incompetent under the common law, and acknowledged the 
unusual record of Arkansas:   
 
Most of these incompetencies have been abolished in 
almost all jurisdictions today. Remnants of them 
remain, however, and Arkansas seems to have retained 
more than most of her sister jurisdictions.
120
 
 
He acknowledged the exclusion of non-believers under the 
common law and turned to the two Arkansas constitutional provisions 
on point.
121
  Citing and quoting Article II, §26, Dean Barnhart sought 
to place Arkansas in the mainstream of American jurisdictions: 
 
The Arkansas constitution has somewhat contradictory 
provisions with respect to religious belief as affecting 
competency of witnesses.  Along with the other states 
of the United States, Arkansas has abolished religious 
                                                 
118
 The constitutions of 1836 and 1864 provided “[t]hat the civil rights, privileges or 
capacities of any citizen shall in no wise be diminished or enlarged on account of his 
religion.”  ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. II, § 4; ARK. CONST. of 1864, art. II, § 4.  The 
constitutions of 1868 and 1874 contained specific language on religious belief and 
testimonial competency.  The constitution of 1868 provided “. . . nor shall any 
person be rendered incompetent to give evidence in any court of law or equity in 
consequence of his opinion upon the subject of religion . . . .”  ARK. CONST. of 1868, 
art. I, § 21.  The constitution of 1874, which remains in place, provides:  “. . . nor 
shall any person be rendered incompetent to be a witness on account of his religious 
belief . . . .” ARK. CONST. of 1874, art. II, § 26. 
119
 Ralph C. Barnhart, Theory of Testimonial Competency and Privilege, 4 ARK. L. 
REV. 377, 381 (1950). 
120
 Id. at 380.  
121
 Id. at 380–81. 
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tests as a prerequisite to competency. . . . Such 
provisions are found in constitutions or statutes of all 
the states in one form or another.
122
 
 
He then acknowledged the language of Article XIX, §1, and 
observed “[t]he cases which have arisen under this last provision of 
the constitution seem to be few, and those which have been reported 
are those in which the competency of a challenged witness was 
upheld.”123  Dean Barnhart concluded his discussion by suggesting 
that the religious test for testimonial competency was unusual and 
subject to criticism: 
 
Wigmore lists Arkansas as one of three remaining 
states which expressly require a theological belief in 
order to be a witness.  This requirement of a specific 
theological belief as a prerequisite of competency is out 
of line with the law elsewhere and has been the subject 
of searching criticism.
124
 
 
The Arkansas religious test for testimonial competency under 
Article XIX, §1 has been considered by the Arkansas courts three 
times.
125
  The 1914 case of Farrell v. State involved the murder 
                                                 
122
 Id. at 381.    
123
 Id. (citing Mueller v. Coffman, 200 S.W. 136 (Ark. 1918); Farrell v. State, 163 
S.W. 768 (Ark. 1914)). 
124
 Id. at 381. 
125
 It has also been ignored by the Supreme Court of Arkansas on one occasion, 
involving an appeal by a convicted murderer who was denied the opportunity to voir 
dire prospective jurors on their religious beliefs and activities. Bader v. State, 40 
S.W.3d 738, 741–42 (Ark. 2001) (“The purpose of the proposed voir dire was . . . to 
use peremptory strikes to remove venire-persons that appellant considered to be too 
religious.”).  In finding “the questions regarding religious preferences that appellant 
was seeking to ask were not so plainly appropriate that we should say the trial 
court’s discretion was abused,” the court noted “[t]he principle that there is a 
prohibition against discrimination based on religious beliefs . . .”  Id. at 741, 742.  
The examples the court used to illustrate the principle display a rare sense of 
whimsy: 
We note that there are prohibitions against using religious tests as 
a qualification for holding office, voting, or exercising the rights of 
a citizen to participate fully in the instrumentalities of government.  
The principles of religious freedom and the prohibition against 
religious discrimination are well-grounded in this country.  The 
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prosecution of J.D. Farrell.
126
  The allegation was that Farrell supplied 
morphine used by three individuals who attempted suicide, two of 
them successfully.
127
  Turner, the unsuccessful suicide, was called by 
the prosecution to testify.
128
  Defense counsel challenged Turner’s 
competency, claiming that he was an atheist.
129
  The trial court found, 
and the appellate course upheld, that Turner was competent to testify 
because he wasn’t an atheist: “A written pamphlet of Mr. Turner 
introduced before the court showed that he did believe in the existence 
of a God . . .”  The Arkansas Supreme Court quoted and applied 
without analysis the religious test for testimonial competence.
130
 
 
The 1918 case of Mueller v. Coffman involved a commercial 
dispute in which the testimony of Coffman was essential to establish 
an agreement between the parties.
131
  It was argued that Coffman was 
incompetent to testify “because of his atheistic belief.”132  The proof 
that Coffman was an atheist consisted of some published verse and his 
testimony in court: 
 
Coffman admitted the authorship of some verse, of 
more or less ambiguous meaning but of atheistic trend, 
which was published in the local paper, and his 
                                                                                                                   
United States Constitution states that “no religious Test shall ever 
be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under 
the United States.”  This principle is similarly articulated in Article 
II, Section 26, of the Arkansas Constitution, which provides that 
“[n]o religious test shall ever be required of any person as a 
qualification to vote or hold office, nor shall any person be 
rendered incompetent to be a witness on account of his religious 
belief; but nothing herein shall be construed to dispense with oaths 
or affirmations.” Id. at 742. 
The principles of religious freedom and the prohibition against religious 
discrimination may be well-grounded in this nation, but they are not ubiquitous. The 
Bader court ignored the Arkansas constitution provision: “No person who denies the 
being of a God shall hold any office in the civil departments of this State, nor be 
competent to testify as a witness in any Court.” ARK. CONST. of 1874, Art. XIX., §1. 
126
 163 S.W. 768, 768 (Ark. 1914). 
127
 Id. at 769. 
128
 Id. 
129
 Id. 
130
  Id. at 770. 
131
 200 S.W. 136, 136 (Ark. 1918). 
132
 Id. 
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examination by opposing counsel indicated the absence 
of a belief in “the being of a God . . . .”133 
 
Counsel having been unsuccessful when following the 
language of the constitutional provision,
134
 the trial judge tried a 
different formulation: 
 
The Court: Let me ask the witness a question, Mr. 
Taylor.  Do you believe in an omnipotent Supreme 
Being, who rewards one or punishes him according to 
his sins committed while here? 
A.  Yes, sir; in a Power; I believe we are punished 
according to our acts. 
Q.  And that that power and disposition to punish 
comes from an omnipotent Supreme Being? 
A.  Yes, sir. 
The Court: I think, Mr. Taylor, under this showing that 
the witness is competent.  Let the objection to his 
competency be overruled.
135
 
 
The Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the competency ruling: 
 
. . . [T]he witness expressed the belief that we are 
punished according to our acts, and that the power and 
disposition to punish comes from an omnipotent 
Supreme Being.  One possessing this belief is not 
incompetent under section 1 of article 19 of the 
Constitution of the State . . .
136
 
 
 In the 1982 case of Flora v. White, the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals upheld the dismissal on standing grounds of a challenge to the 
Arkansas religious test for testimonial competency and the religious 
test for public office under Article XIX, §1 of its constitution.
137
  
Although it did not reach the merits, the court indicated its answer to 
                                                 
133
  Id. 
134
 See infra app. C.1.c.  
135
 Mueller, 200 S.W. at 136–37. 
136
 Id. at 137. 
137
 692 F.2d 53, 54 (8th Cir. 1982). 
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the ultimate question: “. . . we note that the challenged section would 
appear to be inconsistent with Torcaso v. Watkins . . . .”138 
 
 It seems highly unlikely any Arkansas court would attempt to 
give effect to the religious test for testimonial competency under 
Article XIX, Section 1.  First, the language of Article II, Section 26 
seems clear.  Second, as the Eighth Circuit observed, the religious test 
for testimonial competency under Article XIX Section 1 is 
contradicted by the Supreme Court’s pronouncements in Torcaso.  
Third, Arkansas has adopted Federal Rules of Evidence 610, which 
provides: “Evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on matters 
of religion is not admissible for the purpose of showing that by reason 
of their nature his credibility is impared [impaired] or enhanced.”139 
 
 There is one way in which the two Arkansas constitutional 
provisions might be harmonized.  One might read Article XIX, Section 
1 as a threshold inquiry, excluding non-believers as incompetent.  
Those potential witnesses who survived the Article XIX, Section 1 
threshold inquiry – by definition believers – could not thereafter be 
rendered incompetent based on religious belief because of Article II, 
Section 26.  Thus non-believers would be excluded under Article XIX, 
Section 1, but believers could not be excluded as incompetent because 
of other difference in belief.  Thus the state could not exclude 
Catholics as incompetent but include Baptists as competent solely over 
theological differences over transubstantiation.  This construction 
would deny non-believers the protection of Article II, section 26, 
because they have no “religious belief.”  This tortured construction 
requires one to classify the question “do you believe in God” as not a 
test of religious belief. 
 
 As to Maryland, the courts did enforce the religious test for 
witnesses.
140
  That ended in 1965 with the cases of Schowgurow v. 
                                                 
138
 Id. at 54 n.2. 
139
  ARK. CT. R. 610. 
140
 See Arnd v. Amling, 53 Md. 192, 196 (Md. 1880). In an action for damages the 
plaintiffs sought to call a witness who the defendants challenged “for want of 
religious faith.”  Id. The defendants offered testimony of others that the proffered 
witness had said he “did not believe in God.” Id. Without hearing the witnesses, the 
court swore the witness “and inquired of him whether or not he believed in God, and 
that, under His dispensation, he, the said witness, would be held morally accountable 
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State
141
 and State v. Madison.
142
  Schowgurow involved a Buddhist 
who had been convicted of murder by a jury that, pursuant to the 
Maryland constitutional religious test, included jurors without respect 
to religious belief “provided, he believes in the existence of God.”143  
The Schowgurow court noted the Maryland decision in Torcaso,
144
 and 
the Supreme Court reversal.
145
   
 
 In Maryland the exclusion of certain individuals on the basis of 
their religious beliefs was a practical reality, not a theoretical 
possibility: 
 
. . . [T]his Court takes judicial notice of the fact that it 
is and for many years has been a widespread practice in 
this State, not only for grand and petit jurors to be 
questioned as to their belief in God as part of their oath, 
but also for prospective jurors to be so questioned, 
orally or in written interrogations, before their names 
are placed on the jury lists, and that any person who 
does not state his belief in God is excluded.
146
   
 
The court used the Supreme Court’s holding in Torcaso to 
decide the issue of religious tests for jurors: 
 
The State does not deny that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Torcaso renders unconstitutional the long 
established law of this State that expression of a belief 
in the existence of God is a condition precedent to 
                                                                                                                   
for his acts, and punished or rewarded therefor, either in this world or in the world to 
come . . . .” Id. The witness answered in the affirmative. Id. The judge then offered 
the defendants an opportunity to present their testimony attacking the witness’s 
statement of faith. Id. The defendants declined.  Id. The appellate court cited 
commentators for “the general proposition that defect of religious belief is never 
presumed, and the burden of proof is on the objecting party . . . .” Id. at 198.  The 
court of appeals did not in any way question the constitutionality of the exclusion. 
141
 213 A.2d 475 (Md. 1965). 
142
 213 A.2d 880 (Md. 1965). 
143
 Schowgurow, 213 A.2d at 477. 
144
 Torcaso, 162 A.2d at 444. 
145
 Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 496. 
146
 Schowgurow, 213 A.2d at 479.  But see Loker v. State, 233 A.2d 342, 347 (Md. 
1967) (noting that the jury list was made without regard to religious beliefs of 
potential jury members). 
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holding public office.  If, as was held by the Supreme 
Court in Torcaso, a notary public cannot 
constitutionally be required to demonstrate his belief in 
God as a condition to taking office, it follows inevitably 
that the requirement is invalid as to grand and petit 
jurors, whose responsibilities to the public and to the 
persons with whom they deal are far greater.
147
   
 
Madison extended Schowgurow to instances where the 
defendant was not of a religious belief excluded by the constitution.
148
 
 
 The reasoning of the Schowgurow court is consistent with the 
thoughts of other courts which have referred to the Maryland 
constitutional religious tests.
149
  Presumably, the Maryland court 
would extend the analogy to witnesses, holding inevitably that the 
requirement is invalid as to witnesses, whose responsibilities to the 
public and to the persons with whom they deal are far greater than a 
notary public.
150
  
 
 It should be noted that discrimination against witnesses based 
on their religious beliefs is not ended by barring religious tests for 
testimonial competency.  Once witnesses are deemed competent 
without respect to religious belief, the question shifts to whether 
evidence of religious belief can be introduced to attack credibility.  
Three states – Arizona, Oregon, Washington – answered this question 
by adopting constitutional prohibitions on inquiries into religious 
                                                 
147
 Schowgurow, 213 A.2d at 479.  
148
 Madison, 213 A.2d at 885. 
149
 Murray v. Burns, 405 P.2d 309, 322 (Haw. 1965) (“While the religious test 
stricken down by the Supreme Court in Torcaso v. Watkins pertained to 
qualifications under Article 37 of the Declaration of Rights for public office in 
Maryland, it is obvious that the reasoning underlying the opinion and the explicit 
language contained in it apply equally as well to nullify the proviso of Article 36 
disqualifying atheists from jury service.”); Levitsky v. Levitsky, 190 A.2d 621, 625 
(Md. 1963) (“. . . [T]he opening clause of Art. 36 appears to be no longer tenable 
under Torcaso v. Watkins . . . .”).   
150
 But see Jackson v. Garrity, 250 F.Supp. 1 (D. Md. 1965). In Jackson a pro se 
defendant challenged his conviction on the grounds “that the witnesses at petitioner’s 
trial were required to state their belief in God before testifying.”  Id. at 2. The court’s 
analysis dealt with the form of the oath, not the Maryland constitutional religious test 
for witnesses.  MD. CONST., DECL. OF RTS. art. XXXVI. 
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belief to challenge credibility, not merely competence.
151
  This is the 
modern rule; the Federal Rules of Evidence provide that “[e]vidence 
of a witness’s religious beliefs or opinions is not admissible to attack 
or support the witness’s credibility.”152  This rule has been adopted in 
forty-five states, and the remaining states reach the same result by 
alternative means.
153
 
                                                 
151
 See infra app. D,2.a, 15.a, 18.a. 
152
  FED. R. EVID. 610. 
153
 Forty-five states (all but Connecticut, Kansas, Missouri, New York, and Virginia) 
have adopted versions of FED. R. EVID. 610. See ALA. R. EVID. 610; ALASKA R. 
EVID. 610; ARIZ. R. EVID. 610. Arizona has also adopted a constitutional provision 
on point. See infra app. D.2.a. See also ARK. R. EVID. 610; CAL. EVID. CODE §789; 
COLO. R. EVID. 610; DEL. R. EVID. 610; FL. STAT. ANN. § 90.611 (2012); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 24-6-610 (2013); HAW. R. EVID. 610; IDAHO R. EVID. 610; ILL. EVID. R. 610; 
IND. R. EVID. 610; IOWA R. EVID. 5.610; KY. R. EVID. 610 Rule 610; LA. CODE 
EVID. ANN. art. 610 (1989); ME. R. EVID. 610; MD. R. 5-610; MASS. R. EVID.. 610; 
MICH. R. EVID. 610; MINN. R. EVID. 610; MISS. R. EVID. 610; MONT. R. EVID. 610; 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-610 (2014); NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.105 (1971); N.H. R. EVID. 
610; N.J. R. EVID. 610; N.M. R. EVID. 11-610; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-610; N.D. R. 
EVID. 610; OHIO R. EVID. 610; OKL. ST. ANN. tit. 12, § 2610 (2002); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 40.365 (1981). Oregon has also adopted a constitutional provision on point.  See 
infra app. D.15.a. See PA. R. EVID. 610; R.I. R. EVID. 610; S.C. R. EVID. 610; S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 19-14-17 (2014); TENN. R. EVID. 610; TEX. R. EVID. 610; UTAH 
R. EVID. 610; Vt. R. Evid. 610; WASH. R. EVID. 610. Washington has also adopted a 
constitutional provision on point.  See infra app. D.18.a; W.V. R. EVID. 610; Wis. 
Stat. Ann. § 906.10 (2013); WYO. R. EVID. 610.  
 Kansas uses non-uniform language to achieve the same end.  KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 60-430 (1963) (“ Every person has a privilege to refuse to disclose his or her 
theological opinion or religious belief unless his or her adherence or nonadherence to 
such an opinion or belief is material to an issue in the action other than that of his or 
her credibility as a witness.”). 
 Connecticut provides by statute that no person can be disqualified as a 
witness based on his or her disbelief in a supreme being. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 
52-145 (1982) ( “[No person is] disqualified as witness because of his. . . disbelief in 
existence of a supreme being . . . .”).  Although Connecticut case law recognizes “a 
general prohibition against cross-examination on one’s religious beliefs . . . Absent a 
state constitutional provision specifically proscribing such an inquiry, questions 
concerning religion are treated as evidentiary issues when the defendant seeks to 
strengthen his credibility through the use of religion.”  State v. Rogers, 674 A.2d 
1364, 1367 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996). 
 Missouri does not have an evidence code or codified rules of evidence.  
Missouri case law is that it is improper to inquire into religious belief to establish or 
attack credibility.  McClellan v. Owens, 74 S.W.2d 570, 577 (Mo. 1934) (“Clearly 
the great weight of authority is that under constitutional provisions such as ours, the 
question of a witness’s personal belief, even as to there being a God or Supreme 
Vestal  
86  U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 15:1 
 
 
 
 The underlying theory as to why evidence of religious belief 
ought not be admissible to establish or attack credibility was nicely put 
by Justice Edgar M. Cullen of the New York Supreme Court in a 
concurrence in a 1903 commercial law case, Brink v. Stratton.
154
  In 
Brink the witness was asked “whether the witness . . . believed in the 
existence of a Supreme Being who will punish false swearing . . . .”155  
After the objection was overruled, the witness answered: 
 
I do not know anything about it, I am sure. I will reply 
that I am an agnostic.  I have no belief on that subject at 
all.  I do not know anything about it.
156
 
 
 Justice Cullen noted the provision of the New York 
Constitution of 1846 that “. . . no person shall be rendered incompetent 
to be a witness on account of his opinions on matters of religious 
belief,” and stated that there was not dispute about “the competency of 
an infidel or an atheist as a witness.”157  He then identified the two 
approaches to credibility, the Stanbro rule which allowed evidence of 
religious belief to go to credibility, and the Virginia and Kentucky rule 
“that a witness cannot be interrogated as to his belief in the existence 
                                                                                                                   
Being, cannot be inquired into, especially of the witness himself, for the purpose of 
affecting his credibility.”). 
 New York does not have a rule of evidence on point, but “any attempt to 
discredit or otherwise penalize a witness because of his [or her] religious beliefs . . . 
is improper, because those factors are irrelevant to the issue of credibility.”  People 
v. Caba, 66 A.D.3d 1121, 1123 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (quoting People v. Wood, 66 
N.Y.2d 374, 378, 488 (1985)). 
 Virginia’s 2012 rules of evidence provide “the credibility of a witness may 
be impeached by any party other than the one calling the witness, with any proof that 
is relevant to the witness’s credibility.”  VA. R. EVID. 2:607(a).  The impeachment 
rule specifies eight non-exclusive ways in which a witness can be impeached, none 
of which relate to the witness’s religious beliefs.  VA. R. EVID. 2:607(a)(i)-(viii).  
Evidence going to credibility, otherwise relevant, might still be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and the 
likelihood of confusing or misleading the trier of fact.  VA. R. EVID. 2:403.  
Presumably the Virginia courts would find that evidence of religious belief is not 
relevant to the credibility of a witness, or, in the alternative, would find that the 
unfair prejudice of such evidence substantially outweigh its probative value. 
154
 68 N.E. 148, 148 (N.Y. 1903). 
155
 Id. at 150. 
156
 Id.  
157
 Id. at 151. 
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of a Deity or a future state for the purpose of affecting his 
credibility.”158 
 
 In electing between the two approaches, Justice Cullen 
identified the analogy used by the Stanbro court: 
 
The learned court in the Stanbro Case said with entire 
truth that, though a witness may be competent, his 
credibility may be impaired.  It then argued that in 
analogy to the case of a party to an action who is now a 
competent witness, but whose interest in the cause goes 
to his credibility, so the religious belief of a witness, 
while not rendering him incompetent, might be 
considered on the question of the credit to be accorded 
him.
159
 
 
He then challenged the Stanbro analogy: 
 
I think the learned court was misled by a false analogy.  
Interest in the subject-matter and relationship to the 
parties are temporal and mundane influences which 
common experience teaches us tend to bias consciously 
or unconsciously the testimony of witnesses.  But such 
is not naturally the result of abstract religious belief.
160
 
 
 Having addressed the Stanbro analogy, Justice Cullen turned to 
a question rarely raised in these discussions: whether religious belief is 
a reliable predictor of behavior.  He made reference to another New 
York case in which the question was whether evidence of a deceased’s 
atheist beliefs was relevant to the question of whether he committed 
suicide.  The trial court excluded the evidence, and was upheld by the 
appellate court “on the ground that a man’s probable course of action 
could not be predicated from his religious belief.”161 
 
                                                 
158
 Id.   
159
 Id.  
160
  Id. at 151. 
161
 Id. 
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 Justice Cullen quoted with approval the analysis of Judge 
Hunt: 
 
In what way, and how far, do these statements of belief 
operate upon the conduct of man?  Is it certain that he 
who believes in the eternal punishment of the 
impenitent in a future world is a better observer of the 
laws of his country, and more free from actual crime, 
than he who denies that doctrine?  Or is it certain that 
he who believes in the final salvation of all men would 
refrain from an offense which he would have 
committed had he believed that there was no future 
state?  No man can answer with certainty.
162
 
 
Indeed, Justice Cullen asserted that the analysis of Judge Hunt 
applied with even greater force to the facts in Brink than in Gibson 
because religions differ in their treatment of suicide “[b]ut I know of 
no system of religion or code of ethics at any time generally prevalent 
in the world that has failed to condemn falsehood, or to hold truth as a 
virtue.”163 
 
 Having discussed the predictive power of the inquiry into 
religious belief, Justice Cullen turned to the public policy aspects of 
the question: 
 
If, despite the constitutional enactment that no such test 
of competency shall longer prevail, inquiry on the 
subject is still to be made with reference to the witness’ 
credibility, I think we may be led into great 
embarrassments.
164
 
  
He made the argument that the use of evidence of religious 
belief to attack credibility “necessarily fell” as part of the exclusion of 
religious belief evidence to determine admissibility and qualification 
for office: 
 
                                                 
162
 Id.  
163
 Id. at 152. 
164
 Id. 
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I think that the learned court in the Stanbro Case failed 
to appreciate that when the Constitution abrogated all 
disqualifications from office or civil rights the 
consideration of a witness’ religious belief on the 
question of his credibility necessarily fell at the same 
time.  On the trial of a cause, as is pointed out by the 
Supreme Court of Virginia, the judge may be a skeptic 
or an infidel and the juror an agnostic or an atheist. 
Neither can be excluded for that reason from sitting in 
judgment.  Is it possible that we would uphold the 
submission to a jury of a witness’ belief in Christianity 
as impairing his credibility?
165
 
 
 Finally, Justice Cullen confronted the rationale of one of the 
Stanbro judges for allowing religious belief evidence; the other judge 
having stated: 
 
I have no fears that this rule will encourage parties to 
scandalize truly religious witnesses by imputations that 
they profess the worst of creeds.  For, so long as no 
religious test shall be required for judges and jurors, 
parties will be loath to cross-examine witness as to their 
opinions on matters of religious belief, unless they are 
well assured the opinions of the witnesses are very 
obnoxious to the sentiments of citizens . . . .
166
 
 
Justice Cullen argued that this is not a safeguard against abuse, 
it is the danger of the practice: 
 
That which the learned judge considered a safeguard 
against the abuse of the practice, to me constitutes its 
danger.  Doubtless, no wise advocate will interrogate a 
witness as to his religious faith unless it is obnoxious 
and unpopular in the community.  But that is the very 
case in which the exposure of a witness’ religious belief 
would probably lead to injustice. . . . [T]he principle 
involved here is in itself important, and the rule 
                                                 
165
 Id.  
166
 Id. 
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declared by the court, in my judgment, wrong.  
Unfortunately, religious animosities are easily aroused, 
and we should not give sanction to a principle that may 
hereafter work great injustice.
167
 
 
 What of the Illinois ox case where the trial court had refused to 
hear the testimony of Ira Aldrich because he stated: “I don’t believe 
that there is a Supreme Being who will reward and punish men . . 
.”?168  The railroad appealed the exclusion of Aldrich on the basis of 
his religious beliefs.   
 
 The Illinois Supreme Court began its analysis by referring to 
but not quoting the religious liberty provision of the Illinois 
constitution: “The constitution (Art. 13, Sec. 3) has declared complete 
toleration of all religions, and a freedom of conscience to every man to 
worship as he may be enlightened and feel inclined . . . .”169  But, the 
court continued, the constitution:  
 
. . . has no provision that modifies the rules of the 
common law in relation to requiring evidence in courts 
being given upon oath.  Nor has it changed the rules for 
ascertaining those competent to give it.
170
 
 
The Illinois constitution in effect at the time, the constitution of 
1848, did contain two provisions arguably related to the exclusion of 
Aldrich’s testimony on the basis of his religious beliefs.  The Bill of 
Rights provision cited by the court includes language “that no 
preference shall ever be given by law to any religious establishments 
or modes of worship.”171  And the following section of the Bill of 
Rights provides: “That no religious test shall ever be required as a 
qualification to any Office or public trust under this state.”172  The 
court also noted that there was not an Illinois statutory provision on 
                                                 
167
 Id. at 153. 
168
 Cent. Military Tract R.R. Co. v. Rockafellow, 17 Ill. 541, 544 (1856). 
169
 Id. at 552. 
170
 Id. 
171
 ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. XIII, § 3. 
172
 See infra app. B.7.b. 
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point.
173
 
 
 Having said that there were no applicable constitutional or 
statutory provisions, the court moved to the common law rule.  The 
analysis began by noting the formulation of Lord Coke, which 
excluded from testifying all non-Christians, describing it as “a rule as 
narrow, bigoted and inhuman as the spirit of fanatical intolerance and 
persecution which disgraced his age and country.”174 
 
 The court noted with approval Lord Hale’s formulation as: 
 
. . . that all are competent who believe that there is a 
God, the Creator and Preserver of all things, and that 
He will punish them if they swear falsely, in this world 
or in the next; and a want of such belief will render 
them incompetent to take an oath, without which no 
one can testify in a court of justice.
175
 
 
The court did not explain why the Lord Hale formulation is not 
as “narrow, bigoted and inhuman” as that of Lord Coke. 
 
 The court did claim that “there is great uniformity and 
unanimity in the adoption and application of the rule, unchanged by 
any constitution save that of Virginia, which secures religious 
toleration and declares that men’s religion ‘shall in no wise affect, 
diminish, or enlarge their civil capacities.’” 176  This statement is, of 
course, factually incorrect.  By 1856, when the Illinois opinion was 
published, six states – including three of the five states contiguous to 
Illinois – had constitutional provisions barring religious tests for 
testimonial competency: Iowa (1846), New York (1846), Wisconsin 
(1848), California (1849), Indiana (1851), and Ohio (1851).
177
 
 
 The Illinois court was of the opinion that the civil punishment 
for perjury was insufficient: “A liability to civil punishment for 
                                                 
173
 Rockafellow, 17 Ill. at 552. 
174
 Id. 
175
 Id. 
176
 Id. at 553. 
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 See infra apps. D.2.a., 4.a., 5.a., 12.a., 14.a., and 19.a. 
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perjury, and the fear of it, will not substitute that moral, conscientious 
obligation under which witnesses are required to state facts as 
testimony, and which is supposed to be imposed and exist by an oath 
taken by one entertaining such belief.”178  Being ineligible to take the 
oath, non-believers could not give testimony: 
 
. . . one having no religion, believing in no God, and 
not accountable to any punishment for falsehood, here 
or hereafter, except his own notions of honor, veracity 
and amenability to criminal justice, cannot be sworn, as 
no legal, moral, conscientious obligation or 
responsibility, in the view of the law, can be imposed 
by an oath, and he may not testify without.
179
 
 
The court sought to reassure that the exclusion of non-believers 
from testifying was not an abridgement of their rights:  
 
And this is no infringement of freedom of conscience, 
or violation of constitutional tolerance.  He may take 
official oaths, and make ex parte affidavits, for no one 
but a party interested can object to competency, and 
that only to giving testimony against him; or, it may be, 
to sit as a juror . . . and such acts as affect the rights of 
others.
180
 
 
On the basis of his religious beliefs, the Illinois Supreme Court 
found Ira Aldrich incompetent to testify.
181
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 Rockafellow, 17 Ill. at 552. 
179
 Id. at 553–54. 
180
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III. WHY OUGHT WE CARE? 
 
. . . that we are, each of us, finite and imperfect people, 
contending against others who are equally finite and 
imperfect.
182
 
 
Given the holding in Torcaso, it has been clear for fifty years 
that religious tests for office will not be enforced at either the Federal 
or state level.  It must be equally clear that religious tests for 
testimonial competence have no place under the First Amendment.  
Why, then, should we be concerned about the eight state constitutions 
that retain religious tests for public office, and the two of those eight 
that also have religious tests for testimonial competency? 
 
 As to religious tests for both public office and testimonial 
competency, it is hard to gauge the effects of the constitutional 
provisions.  One can look for cases in which the provisions were used 
to attempt to exclude non-believers from public office or the 
courtroom.  As to the tests for public office, even pre-Torcaso there is 
literally no record of any cases being brought to enforce these 
provisions other than the test cases brought to challenge them.  As to 
tests for testimonial competency, there are only a very few reported 
cases.   
 
 But perhaps the impact of the provisions was felt without 
litigation; perhaps knowing of the provisions non-believers did not 
seek public office and did not attempt to testify.  The small number of 
public non-believers into the mid-19
th
 Century suggests that the 
number of people who avoided public positions, or declined to testify, 
because of the religious tests was exceedingly small.
183
  Nor is it clear 
                                                 
182
 Paul Horwitz, Religious Tests in the Mirror: The Constitutional Law and 
Constitutional Etiquette of Religion in Judicial Nominations, 15 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 75, 143 (2006). This is a Reinhold Niebuhr quotation, “finite and sinful men, 
contending against others who are equally finite and equally sinful,” paraphrased to 
be more inclusive. Reinhold Niebuhr, Zeal Without Knowledge, in BEYOND 
TRAGEDY: ESSAYS ON THE CHRISTIAN INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 246 –47 (1937).  
183
 JAMES TURNER, WITHOUT GOD, WITHOUT CREED: THE ORIGINS OF UNBELIEF IN 
AMERICA 44 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1986). With the caveat that the author is 
referring to non-believers who publicly acknowledged their lack of belief, Notre 
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that there would have been support among religious citizens to exclude 
non-believers from office or from testifying.   
 
 Finally, it would have been relatively easy for many non-
believers to avoid the operation of the provisions.  Surely there have 
always been what might be termed “professing non-believers,” 
individuals who maintain the forms of outward rite of the dominant 
religion even while acknowledging – at least to themselves – that they 
do not believe.  It can be assumed that many such professing non-
believers would not have been deterred by the religious tests for public 
office or for testimonial competency.  They would have avoided the 
religious tests by keeping their non-belief private. 
 
Opposition to religious tests for public office and for witness 
competency has always been grounded in the symbolic implications of 
such provisions.  The first concern is that the presence of such 
religious tests, even if unenforceable, sends the message that the 
government is prejudiced against a group of citizens based on religious 
belief.  By declaring non-believers unfit for public office or to testify, 
the religious tests relegate them to second-class status.  The prejudice 
is heightened in situations, as in North Carolina, where the provision 
reinforces the discriminatory message: the North Carolina language 
groups “person[s] who deny the being of God” with “person[s] who 
ha[ve] been adjudged guilty of treason or any other felony” and 
“person[s] who ha[ve] been adjudged guilty of corruption or 
malpractice in any office . . . .”184   
 
A second concern is that the religious tests coarsen our national 
                                                                                                                   
Dame Professor James Turner observes that “. . . America does not seem to have 
harbored a single individual before the nineteenth century who disbelieved in God.” 
Id. (“If one disregards the expatriate [radical poet Joel] Barlow just before 1800 . . . 
.”).  Id. After the Civil War the situation changed:  
Within twenty years after the Civil War, agnosticism emerged as a 
self-sustaining phenomenon.  Disbelief in God was, for the first 
time, plausible enough to grow beyond a rare eccentricity and to 
stake out a sizable permanent niche in American culture.  Id. at 
171. 
Thereafter non-believe matured into a practical option: “By the 1880s, unbelief had 
assumed its present status as a fully available option in American culture . . . it was 
true that many Americans no longer believed in God. . . .”  Id. at 262. 
184
 N.C. CONST. of 1971, art. VI, § 8. 
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discussion of religion by acting as catalysts for religious bigotry.  
Take, for example, the discussion surrounding Cecil Bothwell’s 
election to the Asheville city council.  It was perhaps not surprising 
that arguments against Bothwell taking office started with the North 
Carolina constitutional religious test for office, but the underlying 
hostility of Bothwell’s critics toward non-believers was quite clear.  
H.K. Edgerton cited the constitutional provision: “I’m not saying that 
Cecil Bothwell is not a good man, but if he’s an atheist, he’s not 
eligible to service in public office, according to the state 
constitution.”185  But then he acknowledged his antipathy towards non-
believers:  
 
My father was a Baptist minister.  I’m a Christian man.  
I have problems with people who don’t believe in 
God.
186
 
 
Rather than an establishment or free exercise question, 
Bothwell’s opponents attempted to cast the controversy as “a matter of 
honoring the state constitution.”187  But here, too, the issue wound 
back to Bothwell’s religious beliefs: 
 
If you don’t like it, amend it and take out that clause.  
But don’t just pick and choose what parts you’re going 
to obey.  This is serious business.  I mean, the belief in 
God is not exactly a quirk.
188
 
 
 Even at the Federal level, where the Constitution has always 
contained a prohibition of religious tests for office, the suggestion of 
such a test is the gateway for advocacy of discrimination based on 
religious preference.   
 
In August of 2014, the Air Force refused to allow a Technical 
                                                 
185
 Boston, supra note 15. 
186
 Id. 
187
 Zucchino, supra note 13 (quoting David Morgan, editor of the conservative 
weekly Asheville Tribune). 
188
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Sergeant John Smith
189
 to reenlist solely because he struck the words 
“so help me God” from a reenlistment form.  A non-believer, Airman 
Smith felt he could not truthfully sign the form with the included oath.  
“The airman was told his only options were to sign the religious oath 
section of the contract without adjustment and recite an oath 
concluding with ‘so help me God,’ or leave the Air Force . . . .”190 
 
 An academic commentator was appropriately critical of the Air 
Force’s position: 
 
It is not only a violation of his constitutional rights 
under the First Amendment but an offense to the many 
atheists who have served and continue to serve our 
country. . . . The refusal to accommodate the religious 
beliefs of this service member is deeply disturbing and 
contravenes core American values.  He should 
challenge the rule . . . in federal court.  He will then 
doubly serve his country in standing against not just 
enemies from without but those within our country who 
refuse to respect the religious or non-religious views of 
all citizens.
191
  
 
 Airman Smith challenged the rule.
192
  His argument, based on 
two provisions of the United States Constitution, was both 
straightforward and compelling.  Article VI provides: “no religious 
Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public 
                                                 
189
 Not his real name, which was never publicly disclosed.  The only disclosures 
were that he is a man and a technical sergeant serving at Creech Air Force Base in 
Nevada. 
190
 Stephen Losey, Group: Airman Denied Reenlistment for Refusing to Say ‘So Help 
Me God,’ AIR FORCE TIMES (Sept. 4, 2014, 6:00 AM),  
http://archive.airforcetimes.com/article/20140904/NEWS05/309040066/Group-
Airman-denied-reenlistment-refusing-say-help-me-God-. 
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 Jonathan Turley, Air Force Bars Atheist From Reenlisting Unless He Signs and 
Orally Repeats an Oath to God  (Sept. 10, 2014), 
http://jonathanturley.org/2014/09/10/air-force-bars-atheist-from-reenlisting-unless-
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 E-mail from Monica Miller, Esq., Appignani Humanist Legal Ctr., to Office of 
Inspector Gen., Air Force et al.  (Sept. 2, 2014) (On file with Appignani Humanist 
Legal Ctr.). 
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Trust under the United States.”193  The First Amendment contains the 
free exercise clause: “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . 
.”194  As the Supreme Court stated in Torcaso, the Federal government 
cannot “constitutionally force a person ‘to profess a belief or disbelief 
in any religion.’”195 
 
 The Air Force quickly backed down.
196
  Air Force Secretary 
Deborah Lee James affirmed “[w]e take any instance in which Airmen 
report concerns regarding religious freedom seriously,” announced the 
Air Force was “making the appropriate adjustments to ensure our 
Airmen’s rights are protected,” and confirmed airmen would be 
allowed to reenlist without having to include the affirmation “so help 
me God” in the process.197 
 
 Although the substantive issue was quickly decided in Airman 
Smith’s favor, the suggestion of a religious test gave a patina of 
legitimacy to the intolerance of differing religious views.  For 
example, one commenter thought Airman Smith’s refusal to swear a 
religious oath made him unfit to serve.
198
  Another commenter 
                                                 
193
 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3. 
194
 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
195
 Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495. 
196
  The Air Force policy had been the subject of a number of critical opinion pieces. 
See, e.g., Allan Vestal, How Can Air Forces So Misread Constitution?, DES MOINES 
REGISTER (Sept. 17, 2014, 11:10 PM), 
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/opinion/columnists/2014/09/17/can-air-
force-misread-constitution/15754039/. 
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 Air Force Nixes ‘So Help Me God’ Requirement in Oaths, AIR FORCE TIMES 
(Sept. 17, 2014, 6:06 PM),  
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/09/17/air-force-nixes-so-help-me-
god-requirement-in-oaths/15802309/. In allowing members to omit “so help me 
God,” the Air Force aligned its policy with those of the Army, Navy, and Marine 
Corps.  Rachael Lee, ‘So Help Me God’ Made Optional in Air Force Enlistment 
Oath, CHRISTIANITY DAILY (Sept. 18, 2014, 7:19 PM), 
http://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2014/09/air_force_dumps_so_help_me_god.html. 
198
 Comment by wball, in US. Air Force Allows Scrubbing of “So Help Me God” 
From Enlistment Oath, TOWNHALL.COM (Sept. 19, 2014 5:28 PM), 
http://townhall.com/tipsheet/katiepavlich/2014/09/19/us-air-force-scrubs-so-help-
me-god-from-enlistment-oath-n1893214 (“What good is an oath if you haven't 
sworn to someone or something. If the recruit feels he is unable to take the oath 
properly, he is unfit to serve.”). 
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grouped Airman Smith with “jihadists and unwanted/immoral 
people,”199 yet another thought him an easy convert to Islamic 
extremism: 
 
I fear Atheists can be easy [to] convince to kill 
Christians and even join ISIS, I do not trust Atheists, 
they seems [sic] like they could kill and have no 
remorse.  They seems [sic] cold and not know [sic] real 
deep love for others.
200
 
 
Another thought Airman Smith would be dangerous to have in 
the military: 
 
I don’t want to be around anybody that won’t say Those 
words, I have on the battle field enough years to know 
it ain’t all about skill and superior fire power, 
sometimes things just happen, I have found the ones 
that don’t believe in GOD to be dangerous and just a 
[sic] overall SH– Head.  I’m not the most religious but I 
do rely on GOD for a lot of Help from time to time 
especially when bullets are trying to find me. More 
times than I care to Count I’v [sic] seen men blown 
apart still able to speak I can’t even begin to get a grip 
on that, It has to be Devine Intervention, So why won’t 
the bastards say So Help Me GOD WTF!!!
201
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 Comment by Sourcecode-v14, in U.S. Air Force to Atheists: Declare God in Your 
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Another commenter opined that non-believers cannot be 
trusted: 
 
I'm not going to get into a long diatribe here, but at 
least in this country still exists some of the 
fundamentals of our founding fathers in our military. 
When we speak of God, Country, and Family that still 
means something to many of us. Whether your God is 
Jesus, Allah or your Big Book everyone of substance 
should have one. When the atheists speak out they have 
no foundation, and their lies are innumerous [sic]. They 
would have all denouncing our creator and be damned. 
So yes I absolutely support my US Airforce [sic] on 
this decision because Atheists simply cannot be trusted 
and we all know there are no Atheist in the foxholes.
202
 
  
 The director of issues analysis for the American Family 
Association agreed with the Air Force’s initial, discriminatory 
position: 
 
The Air Force is doing exactly the right thing here.  
There is no place in the United States military for those 
who do not believe in the Creator who is the source of 
every single one of our fundamental human and civil 
rights.  Serving in the military is a privilege, not a 
constitutional right.  And it should be reserved for those 
who have America’s values engraved on their hearts . . 
. . This is an absolutely foundational, non-negotiable, 
bed-rock American principle: there is a Creator . . . and 
he and he alone is the source of the very rights the 
military exists to protect and defend.  An individual 
who does not understand and believe this has no right 
to serve in the U.S. military.  Military service should 
rightly be reserved for those who believe in and are 
willing to die for what America stands for – and what 
America stands for is a belief in God as the source of 
                                                 
202
 Comment by Michael Scott, in Stephen Losey, Atheist Must Swear To God – Or 
Leave US Air Force, THE LIBERTY CRIER (Sept. 10, 2014), 
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our rights . . . . Military service should be reserved for 
genuine Americans – and genuine Americans, like the 
Founders, believe in God.
203
 
 
Televangelist Pat Robertson characterized the Air Force 
decision to make the “so help me God” language optional as “crazy,” 
and managed to inject what some would see as anti-Semitism into the 
discussion: 
 
There’s a left-wing radical named Mickey Weinstein, 
who has got a group of people against religion or 
whatever he calls it, and he has just terrorized the 
armed forces.  You think you’re supposed to be tough, 
you’re supposed to defend us, and you got one little 
Jewish radical who is scaring the pants off of you.  You 
want these guys flying the airplanes to defend us when 
you got one little guy terrorizing them?  That’s what it 
amounts to.  You know, we swear oaths, in the so help 
me God.  What does it mean?  It means that with God’s 
help.  And you don’t have to say you believe in God, 
you just say I want some help beside myself with the 
oath I’m taking.  It’s just crazy.  What is wrong with 
the Air Force? How can they fly the bombers to defend 
us if they cave to one little guy?
204
 
 
 Perhaps the most inappropriate statement in the public 
discussion over Airman Smith’s re-enlistment came from a commenter 
who prayed for the death of those responsible for the policies of the 
Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps making the “so help me God” 
oath optional to accommodate differences in religious belief among 
recruits: 
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I have lost all respect for the Army, Air Force and 
Marines. They have gone out of their way to 
accommodate evil and alienate the very God they need 
for protection in battle. To whom shall they turn now. I 
pray the officers who worked this evil meet a deadly 
fate on the battle field.
205
 
 
Such statements, in some sense endorsed by state constitutional 
religious tests for office, coarsen our national discussion at a time we 
should be seeking reconciliation on matters of religion in our public 
life. 
 
Removing unenforceable state constitution religious tests 
because of their symbolic effect is consistent with the effort to elevate 
our national discussion involving matters of religion.  In an article on 
the Federal religious test clause, in which he argues – correctly, I think 
– for a narrow reading of the third clause of Article VI in the context 
of Federal judicial nominations, Professor Paul Horwitz calls for an 
“etiquette of pluralism” in our use of religion in our public 
discourse.
206
  Two of the guidelines he suggests, genuine respect and 
humility, have application in the context of state constitutional 
religious tests for office. 
 
Professor Horwitz speaks of genuine respect in terms of 
respect for religion: 
 
One of the reasons that religion should not be excluded 
from public discussion, or from the public square more 
broadly, is that to do so fails to show genuine respect 
for the vital role of religion in people’s lives, and for all 
that it contributes to our public dialogue.  Such policies 
of exclusion are disrespectful to the religious 
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individuals who make up a substantial part of the 
polity, and who wish to participate equally in our 
political dialogue without being constrained to remain 
silent about those values and motivations that drive 
them the most deeply.  To ask them to do so is more 
than disrespectful; it is a form of violence.
207
 
 
Surely Professor Horwitz would extend the call for respect to 
encompass respect for non-believers.  To include non-believers would 
show genuine respect for the vital role of non-belief in some people’s 
lives, and for all that non-religious critiques contribute to our public 
dialogue.  To exclude such points of view is disrespectful to the non-
believing citizens who wish to participate equally in our political 
dialogue without being constrained to remain silent about those values 
and motivations that drive them the most deeply. To exclude such non-
believing voices is more than disrespectful; it is a form of violence. 
 
After all, Professor Horwitz acknowledges the prospect that the 
presence of religion in our public dialogue will also bring about the 
presence of criticism: “If religion is to enter into public dialogue, it is 
appropriate to understand and expect that some criticism – hopefully 
thoughtful, but quite possibly stringent nonetheless – will be mixed in 
with the praise.”208 
 
Which brings us to the other of Professor Horwitz’s guidelines 
that applies: humility.  As he observes, “. . . in our ‘world of multi-
lingual discourse,’ in which both religious and non-religious 
individuals engage each other in the public square, we ought always to 
be conscious of our own limits, and strive to make our arguments with 
‘humility and tolerance.’”209  It is a virtue that he would call upon both 
the religious and the non-believer to exhibit.   
 
. . . [I]n thinking about how each of us can engage in 
religious talk in the public square, or how those of us 
                                                 
207
 Id. at 141 (citations omitted). 
208
 Id. 
209
 Id. at 144 (quoting Daniel O. Conkle, Secular Fundamentalism, Religious 
Fundamentalism, and the Search for Truth in Contemporary America, 12 J. L. & 
RELIGION 337, 368 (1995–96). 
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who are non-religious can engage with religious ideas 
in the public square, we might keep in mind a virtue 
that one might hope always characterizes our efforts to 
enter public dialogue: that of humility.  Humility does 
not counsel us to refrain from any religious or secular 
judgments at all, or to disengage from the public square 
altogether.  But it reminds us that we are, each of us, 
“finite and sinful men, contending against others who 
are equally finite and equally sinful.”210 
 
With the obvious caveat about inclusiveness, Professor 
Horwitz is surely correct about the need for humility.  
 
It would elevate our national discourse on matters of belief to 
demonstrate genuine respect and humility by removing religious tests 
for office and for testimonial competency from the state constitutions 
of Arkansas, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas.  There is some support for a 
campaign to remove religious tests for office and testimonial 
competency.
211
  What are the prospects for such a positive 
development, and what would be the effect of attempts to remove the 
religious tests failed? 
 
 Consider Arkansas, which has state constitution religious tests 
for both public office and testimonial competency.  What are the 
prospects for removing the religious tests from the state constitution?  
To start, the Arkansas constitution is relatively easy to amend; the 
current 1874 constitution has been amended over eighty times.
212
  The 
Arkansas constitution can be amended either by a measure passed by 
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some estimates, only five other states have constitutions as easy to amend as 
Arkansas[.]”) 
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majorities in both houses of the legislature and by a majority of 
voters,
213
 or by a measure initiated by ten percent of the voters and 
passed by a majority of voters.
214
 
 
 But the amendment process has “pitted modernizers against 
traditionalists in the state” in “the passage of amendment after 
amendment in a desperate attempt to catch up to modernization.”215  
The attempt, it is suggested, has not been successful: “. . . amending 
the constitution has . . . failed to fully allocate social and political 
rights . . .”216  The Arkansas constitution “reflects values shared by 
most Americans: faith in God and belief in the sovereignty of God.”217  
The challenge for removing the religious tests is suggested by the 
experience in an earlier attempt to replace the 1874 constitution: 
 
To further illustrate the importance of religion in 
Arkansas government, it is noteworthy that opponents 
to the proposed 1970 Arkansas state constitution argued 
the document was “atheistic” because “Almighty God” 
was removed from the bill of rights.  In response to this 
accusation, proponents reinserted the phrase in the 
preamble, but the proposal was defeated nonetheless. . . 
Clearly, the 1874 constitution, and the vision it 
promulgates, is firmly rooted in the religiously 
conservative soil of Arkansas’s political culture.218 
 
 The prospects for removing the Arkansas constitutional 
religious tests for public office and testimonial competency are not 
favorable, as was evidenced by a 2009 effort to repeal the Arkansas 
provision.
219
 The constitutional amendment was introduced by 
                                                 
213
 ARK. CONST. Art. XIX., §22, construed in Jewell, supra note 69, at 431. 
214
 Id. 
215
 NILES, supra note 212, at 252. 
216
 Id. at 268. 
217
 Id. at 256. 
218
 Id. at 257. 
219
 Radio Interview with Richard Carroll, Arkansas State Representative, at Ind. Pol. 
Report (May 2009), available at http://www.blogtalkradio.com/ind-pol-
report/2009/05/10/richard-carroll-arkansas-state-representative; see also David 
Waters, Atheist Revival in Arkansas, ONFAITH (Feb. 13, 2009), 
http://www.faithstreet.com/onfaith/2009/02/13/an-advocate-for-atheists-in-ar/8289 
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Representative Richard L. Carroll, a first-term member from North 
Little Rock.
220
  The proposed amendment was the subject of 
“considerable debate” with other members of the House before it was 
introduced.
221
  Testimony was taken, but some non-believers were 
reluctant to testify.
222
  Some legislators didn’t think the measure was 
necessary:  “. . . they feel like as long as no one is persecuted for those 
beliefs and they are not kept from holding office or they are not kept 
from testifying in court, that there is no need to address it in the 
constitution.”223  Representative Carroll disagreed, looking at the 
effect that the constitutional provision had on those against whom it is 
directed: 
 
But with it being there in the constitution it injects the 
fear that will I be persecuted for seeking office and 
being an atheist or will I be persecuted for coming to 
testify in a courtroom and being an atheist.  Those are 
fears that are injected into individuals, and that was 
what I was trying to address.  Those individuals 
shouldn’t have to go through those fears they should be 
able to testify with a clear conscience and they should 
be able to run for office if they want to run for office 
with a clear conscience not worry about if I win and 
this comes out will I be seated.
224
  
 
                                                                                                                   
(reporting on HJR 1009, to repeal the Arkansas constitution prohibition on atheists 
holding office and testifying).  
220
 Interview with Richard Carroll, supra note 219 (noting Rep. Carroll, a 
boilermaker by profession, was elected in 2008 on the Green Party ticket, making 
him for a time the highest-ranking elected official of the Green Party in the nation.  
He ran as a Green because of a situation involving the Democratic candidate which 
arose too late to get Rep. Carroll on the ballot as a Democrat.  At the conclusion of 
the legislative session, he switched to the Democratic Party.  Representative 
Carroll’s biography on the Arkansas State Legislature site lists his “church 
affiliation” as Catholic). 
221
 Id. (“[A]fter considerable debate with some individuals in the House I decided 
that I would go ahead and bring it forward[.]”). Id. 
222
 Id. 
223
 Id. 
224
 Interview with Richard Carroll, supra note 219.  
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 The proposal was referred to committee, where it died.
225
    
Representative Carroll explained the resistance on the part of other 
members:  “As far as the bill itself, they . . . being a southern, Bible-
belt area, the right-wing legislators weren’t willing to go forward with 
that piece because of . . . it could possibly go against their 
constituents’ viewpoints.”226 
 
Representative Carroll expected that there would be a political 
price to pay for his advocacy of the constitutional amendment: “. . . I 
decided that I would go ahead and bring it forward no matter what it 
would do to me politically.”227  He was defeated in the next 
Democratic primary by a margin of over sixty percentage points.
228
 
   
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
. . . religious toleration, in which this State has taken 
pride, was never thought to encompass the ungodly. 
 
     Judge William L. Henderson 
     Maryland Court of Appeals 
     Torcaso v. Watkins
229
 
 
As he was about to find out from Justice Black, Judge 
Henderson was simply wrong about whether non-believers are owed 
the protection of the Constitution:   
 
                                                 
225
 Amending the Arkansas Constitution to Repeal the Prohibition against an Atheist 
Holding an Office in the Civil Departments of the State of Arkansas or Testifying as 
a Witness in any Court, H.R. 1009, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2009). 
226
 Interview with Richard Carroll, supra note 219. 
227
Id. 
228
 Statewide Results by Contest, ARKANSAS SECRETARY OF STATE (June 18, 2010, 
4:56 PM), 
http://www.sos.arkansas.gov/electionresults/index.php?ac:show:contest_statewide=1
&elecid=211&contestid=192 (2011); see also November 4, 2014 Arkansas General 
Election and Nonpartisan Runoff Election Official County Results, ARKANSAS 
SECRETARY OF STATE (last updated Nov. 14, 2014, 6:27 PM), 
http://results.enr.clarityelections.com/AR/Pulaski/53298/147403/Web01/en/summar
y.html (showing Carroll losing the November 2014 election for District 14 by over 
nineteen percentage points). 
229
 Torcaso, 162 A.2d at 443–44. 
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The “establishment of religion” clause of the First 
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the 
Federal Government . . . can pass laws which aid one 
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over 
another.  Neither can . . . force him to profess a belief 
or disbelief in any religion.  No person can be punished 
for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or 
disbeliefs . . .
230
 
 
 Judge Henderson was also wrong to frame the question as one 
of “religious toleration.”  From the Second Great Awakening, 
Americans have had a commitment to voluntarism and individual 
competence, and to democracy, in matters of religious belief.  
Voluntarism and individual competence mean that we expect 
individual’s decisions on matters of religion to be voluntary and not 
compelled.
231
  The necessary corollary of voluntarism is the 
proposition that governmental compulsion ought have no role in 
matters of religion or, as the Southern Baptist Convention so 
eloquently stated it almost sixty years ago, the “aversion to any effort 
to use the . . . powers of government to lay the weight of a feather 
upon the conscience of any man in the realm of religion by privilege 
or penalty.”232 
 
 The centrality of voluntarism and an absence of governmental 
compulsion was nicely illustrated in a tract published in Boston in 
1835 during the blasphemy trial of Abner Kneeland, the last man 
imprisoned in the United States for blasphemy: 
 
A religion that cannot withstand the force of argument, 
the shafts of ridicule, and the thunder of invective – a 
religion that requires for its support, the axe, the rack 
and the faggot, has but weak claims to divinity, and is 
hardly worth protecting at such cost.  A religion 
                                                 
230
 Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 492–93 (quoting Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 
15–6 (1947)). 
231
 DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF AMERICA, 1815-1848 188 (Oxford University Press 2007). 
232
 Resolution on Religious Liberty, SOUTHERN BAPTIST CONVENTION (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/934/resolution-on-religious-liberty. 
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founded upon coercion in this world, and upon menace 
in the next, is surely but poorly calculated to soften the 
heart, to chasten the feelings, or to increase, in the 
aggregate, the sum of human felicity.
233
 
 
 Our commitment to voluntarism and individual competency 
was accompanied by the democratization of religion: 
 
The democratization of Christianity . . . has less to do 
with the specifics of polity and governance and more 
with the incarnation of the church into popular culture.  
In at least three respects the popular religious 
movements of the early republic articulated a 
profoundly democratic spirit.  First, they denied the 
age-old distinction that set the clergy apart as a separate 
order of men, and they refused to defer to learned 
theologians and traditional orthodoxies . . . Second, 
these movements empowered ordinary people by taking 
their deepest spiritual impulses at face value rather than 
subjecting them to the scrutiny of orthodox doctrine 
and the frowns of respectable clergymen . . . [Third,] 
Religious outsiders flushed with confidence about their 
prospects, had little sense of their limitations . . . 
234
 
  
 A commitment to voluntarism and individual competence in 
matters of religion carried with it the possibility that some individuals 
would come to non-belief.  A commitment to democracy required that 
such individuals, even as to those who thought them in error, be 
accorded equal treatment under the law as a matter of right, not grace.   
 
Given our commitment to voluntarism and individual 
competence, and to democracy, framing our approach to religious 
liberty as one of toleration is inapt.  As Baptist abolitionist and 
religious liberty advocate John Leland declared in 1790: “the very idea 
of toleration is despicable; it supposes that some have a pre-eminence 
                                                 
233
 A COSMOPOLITE, A REVIEW OF THE PROSECUTION AGAINST ABNER KNEELAND 
FOR BLASPHEMY 10 (Boston 1835). 
234
 NATHAN O. HATCH, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF AMERICAN CHRISTIANITY 9–10 
(Yale University Press 1989). 
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above the rest, to grant indulgence; whereas, all should be equally free, 
Jews, Turks, Pagans and Christians.”235  The right of the non-believer 
to make decisions on matters of religion makes the concept of 
toleration inapplicable, as Andrew Dunlap stated in his 1834 defense 
of Abner Kneeland:  
 
This is the boasted land of toleration.  No, gentlemen, 
that is not the proper word, for who shall presume to 
tolerate another, when the latter has an undeniable right 
to enjoy and maintain his own opinions?  I should have 
said this is the boasted land of civil and religious 
freedom, guaranteed by written Constitutions of 
Government, so plain that he who runs may read the 
privileges which they secure, and the rights they 
proclaim.
236
 
 
 In 1776, at a time when the constitutions of the emerging 
American states were rife with religious discrimination, Virginia 
adopted a Declaration of Rights provision on religion that charted a 
very different direction: 
 
That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, 
and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only 
by reason and conviction, not by force or violence; and 
therefore all men are equally entitled to the free 
exercise of religion, according to the dictates of 
conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of all to 
practice Christian forbearance, love, and charity 
towards each other.
237
 
 
Only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence.  
Genuine respect and humility.  These noble sentiments are precisely 
                                                 
235
 DICKSON D. BRUCE, JR., EARNESTLY CONTENDING: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND 
PLURALISM IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 124 (University of Virginia Press 2013).  
236
 ANDREW DUNLAP, A SPEECH DELIVERED BEFORE THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE 
CITY OF BOSTON IN DEFENSE OF ABNER KNEELAND ON AN INDICTMENT FOR 
BLASPHEMY 17 (Kessinger Publishing 2010) (1834); BRUCE, supra note 235, at 
124–25.  
237
 VA. CONST. of 1776, art. I, §16. 
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why the six states that still have religious tests for public office in their 
state constitutions – Mississippi, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas – and the two states that have both 
religious tests for public office and religious tests for testimonial 
competency – Arkansas and Maryland – should remove them.  
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Appendix A.  State Constitutions with Religious Tests for Office. 
 
1. Arkansas  
a. ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. IX, § 2 (“No person who denies 
the being of a God, shall hold any office in the civil 
departments of this State, nor be allowed his oath in any 
court.”).  
b. ARK. CONST. of 1864, art. IX, § 2 (“No person who denies 
the being of a God, shall hold any office in the civil 
departments of this State, nor be allowed his oath in any 
court.”).  
c. ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 21 (“No religious test or 
amount of property shall ever be required as a qualification 
for any office of public trust under this State. . .”).  
d. ARK. CONST. of 1874, art. VIII, § 3 (“No person who 
denies the being of a God shall hold any office in the civil 
departments of this State, nor be competent to testify as a 
witness in any court.”). 
2. Delaware  
a. DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. XXII (“Every person who shall 
be chosen a member of either House, or appointed to any 
office or place of trust, before taking his seat, or entering 
upon the execution of his office, shall take the following 
oath, or affirmation, if conscientiously scrupulous of taking 
an oath, to wit: ‘I _________, will bear true allegiance to 
the Delaware State, submit to its constitution and laws, and 
do not act wittingly whereby the freedom thereof may be 
prejudiced.’ and also make and subscribe the following 
declaration, to wit: ‘I _________, do profess faith in God 
the Father, and in Jesus Christ His only Son, and in the 
Holy Ghost, One God, blessed for evermore; and I do 
acknowledge the holy scriptures of the Old Testament and 
New Testament to be given by Divine Inspiration.”). 
3. Maryland  
a. MD. CONST. of 1851, Declaration of Rights, art. 34 (“That 
no other test or qualification ought to be required on 
admission to any office of trust or profit, than such oath of 
office as may be prescribed by this Constitution, or by the 
Laws of the State, and a declaration of belief in the 
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Christian religion; and if the party shall profess to be a Jew, 
the declaration shall be of his belief in a future state of 
rewards and punishments.”).  
b. MD. CONST. of 1864, Declaration of Rights, art. 37 (“That 
no other test or qualification ought to be required, on 
admission to any office of trust or profit, than such oath of 
allegiance and fidelity to this State, and the United States, 
as may be prescribed by this Constitution; and such oath of 
office and qualification as may be prescribed by this 
Constitution, or by the laws of the State, and a declaration 
of belief in the Christian religion, or in the existence of 
God, and in a future state of rewards and punishments.”).  
c. MD. CONST. of 1867, Declaration of Rights, art. 37 (“That 
no religious test ought ever be required as a qualification 
for any office of profit or trust in this State, other than a 
declaration of belief in the existence of God . . .”). 
4. Massachusetts  
a. MASS. CONST. of 1780, ch. VI, art. I. (“Any person chosen 
governor, lieutenant-governor, councilor, senator, or 
representative, and accepting the trust, shall, before he 
proceed to execute the duties of his place or office, make 
and subscribe the following declaration, viz: ‘I, A.B., do 
declare that I believe the Christian religion, and have a firm 
persuasion of its truth; and that I am seized and possessed, 
in my own right, of the property required by the 
constitution as one qualification for the office or place to 
which I am elected. . . .”). 
5. Mississippi  
a. MISS. CONST. of 1817, art. VI, § 6 (“No person who denies 
the being of God, or of a future state of rewards and 
punishments, shall hold any office the civil department of 
this State.”).  
b. MISS. CONST. of 1832, art. VII, § 5 (“No person who denies 
the being of a God, or of a future state of rewards and 
punishments, shall hold any office the civil department of 
this state.”).  
c. MISS. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 23 (“No religious test, as a 
qualification for office, shall ever be required, and no 
preference shall ever be given by law to any religious sect 
or mode of worship; but the free enjoyment of all religious 
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sentiments, and the different modes of worship shall ever 
be held sacred; Provided, The rights hereby secured shall 
not be construed to justify acts of licentiousness, injurious 
to morals, or dangerous to the peace and safety of the 
State.”).  
d. MISS. CONST. of 1868, art. XII, § 3 (“No person who denies 
the existence of a Supreme Being shall hold any office in 
this State.”).  
e. MISS. CONST. of 1890, art. XIV, § 265 (“No person who 
denies the existence of a Supreme Being shall hold any 
office in this state.”), but see Miss. Con. (1890), Art. III., 
§18 (“No religious test as a qualification for office shall be 
required.”). 
6. New Jersey  
a. N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XIX (“That there shall be no 
establishment of any one religious sect in this Province, in 
preference to another; and that no Protestant inhabitant of 
this Colony shall be denied the enjoyment of any civil 
right, merely on account of his religious principles; but that 
all persons, professing a belief in the faith of any Protestant 
sect, who shall demean themselves peaceably under the 
government, as hereby established, shall be capable of 
being elected into any office of profit or trust, or being a 
member of either branch of the Legislature, and shall fully 
and freely enjoy every privilege and immunity, enjoyed by 
others their fellow subjects.”). 
7. North Carolina  
a. N.C. CONST. of 1776, § 32 (“That no person who shall 
deny the being of God, or the truth of the Protestant 
religion, or the divine authority of either Old or New 
Testaments, or who shall hold religious principles 
incompatible with the freedom and safety of the State, shall 
be capable of holding any office, or place of trust or profit, 
in the civil department, within this State.”).  
b. N.C. CONST. of 1835 (Amendments of 1835) art. IV, § 2 
(“The thirty-second section of the constitution shall be 
amended to read as follows: No person who shall deny the 
being of God, or the truth of the Christian religion, or the 
divine authority of the Old and New Testament, or who 
shall hold religious principles incompatible with the 
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freedom or safety of the State, shall be capable of holding 
any office or place of trust or profit in the civil department 
within this State.”).  
c. N.C. CONST. of 1861 (Amendments of 1861-1862) § IX 
(“Be it ordained by the delegates of the people of North 
Carolina in Convention assembled, and it is hereby 
ordained by the authority of the same, That the second 
section of the fourth article of the amendments to the 
Constitution shall be amended to read as follows: ‘No 
person who shall deny the being of God, or the divine 
authority of both the Old and New Testaments, or who 
shall hold religious opinions incompatible with the freedom 
or safety of the State, shall be capable of holding any 
public office or  place of trust or profit in the civil 
department of this State.’”).  
d. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art VI, § 5 (“The following classes of 
persons shall be disqualified for office: First, All persons 
who shall deny the being of Almighty God.  Second; All 
persons who shall have been convicted of treason, perjury 
or any other infamous crime, since becoming citizens of the 
United States, or of corruption, or malpractice in office, 
unless such persons shall have been legally restored to the 
rights of citizenship.”).  
e. N.C. CONST. of 1971, art. VI, § 8 (“The following persons 
shall be disqualified for office: First, any person who shall 
deny the being of Almighty God. . . ”).  
8. Pennsylvania  
a. PA. CONST. of 1776, § 10 (“. . . And each member, before 
he takes his seat, shall make and subscribe the following 
declaration, viz: I do believe in one God, the creator and 
governor of the universe, the rewarder of the good and the 
punisher of the wicked.  And I do acknowledge the 
Scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be given by 
Divine inspiration.  And no further or other religious test 
shall ever hereafter be required of any civil officer or 
magistrate in this State.”).  
b. PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 4 (“That no person who 
acknowledges the being of a God, and a future state of 
rewards and punishments, shall on account of his religious 
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sentiments, be disqualified to hold any office or place of 
trust or profit under this Commonwealth.”).  
c. PA. CONST. of 1838, art. IX, § 4 (“No person, who 
acknowledges the being of a God and a future state of 
rewards and punishments, shall on account of his religious 
sentiments be disqualified to hold any office or place of 
trust or profit under this commonwealth.”).  
d. PA. CONST. of 1874, art. I, § 4 (“No person who 
acknowledges the being of a God and a future state of 
rewards and punishments shall, on account of his religious 
sentiments, be disqualified to hold any office or place of 
trust or profit under this Commonwealth.”).  
e. PA. CONST. of 1968, art. I, § 4 (“No person who 
acknowledges the being of a God and a future state of 
rewards and punishments shall, on account of his religious 
sentiments, be disqualified to hold any office or place of 
trust or profit under this Commonwealth.”). 
9. South Carolina  
a. S.C. CONST. of 1895, art. VI, § 2 (“No person who denies 
the existence of a Supreme Being shall hold any office 
under this Constitution.”); art. XVII, § 4 (“No person who 
denies the existence of a Supreme Being shall hold any 
office under this Constitution.”). 
10. Tennessee  
a. TENN., CONST. of 1796, art. VIII, § 3 (“No person who 
denies the being of God or a future State of rewards and 
punishments shall hold any office in the civil Department 
of this State.”).  
b. TENN., CONST. of 1796, art. VIII, § 4 (“That no religious 
test shall ever be required as a qualification to any Office 
or public trust under this State.”).  
c. TENN., CONST. of 1870, art. IX, § 2 (“No person who 
denies the being of God, or a future state of rewards and 
punishments, shall hold any office in the civil department 
of this state.”), but see, TENN., CONST. of 1870, art. I, § 4 
(“That no political or religious test, other than an oath to 
support the Constitution of the United States and of this 
state, shall ever be required as a qualification to any office 
or public trust under this State.”). 
11. Texas 
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a. TEX., CONST. of 1876, art. I, § 4 (“No religious test shall 
ever be required as a qualification to any office, or public 
trust, in this State; nor shall any one be excluded from 
holding office on account of his religious sentiments, 
provided he acknowledge the existence of a Supreme 
Being.”). 
12. Vermont 
a. VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. II, § IX. (“. . . And each member, 
before he takes his seat, shall make and subscribe the 
following declaration, viz. ‘I ___________ do believe in 
one God, the Creator and Governor of the Diverse, the 
warder of the good and punisher of the wicked.  And I do 
acknowledge the scriptures of the old and new testament to 
be given by divine inspiration, and own and profess the 
protestant religion.’  And no further or other religious test 
shall ever, hereafter, be required of any civil officer or 
magistrate in this State.”).  
b. VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. II, § XII. (“. . . And each member, 
before he takes his seat, shall make and subscribe the 
following declaration, viz.  You do believe in one God, the 
Creator and Governor of the Diverse, the warder of the 
good and punisher of the wicked.  And you do 
acknowledge the scriptures of the Old and New Testament 
to be given by divine inspiration, and own and profess the 
protestant religion.  And no further or other religious test 
shall ever, hereafter, be required of any civil officer or 
magistrate in this State.”). 
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Appendix B.  State Constitutions with Prohibitions on Religious Tests 
for Office. 
 
Alabama 
Ala. Const. of 1819, art. I, § 7. 
Ala. Const. of 1861, art. I, § 7. 
Ala. Const. of 1865, Art I, § 4. 
Ala. Const. of 1875, art. I, § 4. 
Ala. Const. of 1901, art. I, § 3. 
Arizona 
Ariz. Const. of 1912, art. II, § 12. 
Arkansas 
Ark. Const. of 1868, art. I, § 21.  
California 
Cal. Const. of 1849, art. XI, § 3.  
Cal. Const. of 1880, art. XX, § 3. 
Delaware 
Del. Const. of 1792, art. I, § 2.  
Del. Const. of 1831, art. I, § 2.  
Del. Const. of 1897, art. I, § 2.  
Georgia 
Ga. Const. of 1861, art. I, § 7.  
Ga. Const. of 1865, art. I, § 5.  
Ga. Const. of 1868, art. I, § 6.  
Ga. Const. of 1877, art. I, Par. XIII.  
Ga. Const. of 1945, art. I, Par. XIII.  
Ga. Const. of 1976, art. I, § I, Par. III. 
Ga. Const. of 1983, art. I, § I, Par. IV.  
Illinois 
Ill. Const. of 1818, art. VIII, § 4.  
Ill. Const. of 1848, art. VIII, § 4.  
Indiana 
Ind. Const. of 1816, art. I, § 3.  
Ind. Const. of 1851, art. I, § 5. 
Iowa 
Iowa Const. of 1846, art. II, § 4.  
Iowa Const. of 1857, art. I, § 4. 
Kansas 
Kan. Const. of 1859, Kansas Bill of Rights, § 7. 
Louisiana 
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La. Const. of 1868, art. I, § 12. 
Maine 
Me. Const. of 1820, art. I, § 3. 
Michigan 
Mich. Const. of 1835, art. XII, § 1.  
Mich. Const. of 1850, art. 18, § 1.  
Mich. Const. of 1908, art. XVI, § 2.  
Mich. Const. of 1963, art. XI, § 1. 
Minnesota 
Minn. Const. of 1857, art. I, § 17. 
Missouri 
Mo.  Const. of 1820, art. XIII, § 5.  
Mo.  Const. of 1865, art. I, § 9.  
Mo.  Const. of 1875, art. II, § 5.  
Mo.  Const. of 1945, art. I, § 5.   
Montana 
Mont.  Const. of 1973, art. III, § 3. 
Nebraska 
Neb. Const. of 1875, art. I, § 4. 
New Jersey 
N.J. Const. of 1844, art. I, § 4.  
N.J. Const. of 1947, art. I, § 4. 
New York 
N.Y. Const. of 1821, art. VI, § 1.  
N.Y. Const. of 1846, art. XII, § 1. 
North Dakota 
N.D. Const. of 1889, art. XI, § 4.  
Ohio 
 Ohio Const. of 1802, art. VIII, § 3.  
Ohio Const. of 1851, art. I, § 7. 
Oregon 
Ore. Const. of 1859, art. I, § 4. 
Rhode Island 
R.I. Const. of 1986, art. I, § 3. 
South Dakota 
S.D. Const. of 1889, art. VI, § 3. 
Tennessee 
Tenn. Const. of 1835, art. I, § 4. 
Texas 
Tex. Const. of 1845, art. I, § 3.  
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Tex. Const. of 1866, art. I, § 3.  
Tex. Const. of 1869, art. I, § 3. 
Utah 
Utah Const. of 1895, art. I, § 4. 
Virginia 
Va. Const. of 1830, art. III, § 11.  
Va. Const. of 1971, art. I, § 16. 
Washington 
Wash. Const. of 1889, art. I, § 11. 
West Virginia 
W.Va. Const. of 1863, art. II, § 9.  
W.Va. Const. of 1872, art. III, § 11. 
W. Va. Const. of 1872, art. III, § 15. 
Wisconsin 
Wis. Const. of 1848, art. I, § 19. 
Wyoming 
Wyo. Const. of 1889, art. I, § 18. 
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Appendix C. State Constitutions with Religious Tests for Witness 
Competency. 
 
1. Arkansas 
a. ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. IX, § 2 (“No person who denies 
the being of a God, shall hold any office in the civil 
departments of this State, nor be allowed his oath in any 
court.”).  
b. ARK. CONST. of 1864, art. IX, § 2 (“No person who denies 
the being of a God, shall hold any office in the civil 
departments of this State, nor be allowed his oath in any 
court.”).  
c. ARK. CONST. of 1874, art. XIX, § 1 (“No person who 
denies the being of a God shall hold any office in the civil 
departments of this State, nor be competent to testify as a 
witness in any court.”). 
2. Maryland 
a. MD. CONST. of 1851, Declaration of Rights, art. 33 (“. . . 
nor shall any person be deemed incompetent as a witness or 
juror, who believes in the existence of a God, and that 
under his dispensation such person will be held morally 
accountable for his acts, and be rewarded or punished 
therefor, either in this world or the world to come.”).  
b. MD. CONST. of 1864, Declaration of Rights, art. 36 (“. . . 
nor shall any person be deemed incompetent as a witness or 
juror, who believes in the existence of God, and that under 
his dispensation such person will be held morally 
accountable for his acts, and be rewarded or punished 
therefor, either in this world or the world to come.”).  
c. MD. CONST. of 1867, Declaration of Rights, art. 36 (“no 
person otherwise competent shall be deemed incompetent 
as a witness or juror on account of his religious belief, 
provided that he believes in the existence of God, and that 
under His dispensation such person will be held morally 
accountable for his acts, and will be rewarded or punished 
therefor either in this world or the world to come.”). 
 
 
